.... despite the range of legal systems, institutional frameworks and traditions, there is considerable convergence across Europe in the elements of national corporate governance codes. Most of these codes are closely related to the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance – either by making explicit reference, or by incorporating the principles within the national code, supplemented by local rules and guidance".
Monday, 30 November 2009
Europe: corporate governance statements and the auditors' assurance role - FEE discussion paper
Hong Kong: company law reform

- the director's duty of skill, care and diligence should be codified
- all companies should have at least one natural person acting as a director
- reduction of capital should be permitted through a court-free procedure involving a solvency test
- the statutory derivative action should be extended to include multiple derivative actions, thereby bringing it in line with the shareholder's common law right to bring an action on behalf of the company following the decision of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Waddington Ltd v Chan Chun Hoo Thomas and others [2008] FACV 15/2007.
Friday, 27 November 2009
India: MCA seeks comments on task force report and recommendations

Most Indian listed companies are controlled by promoters, often holding over 50 per cent of the voting stock. Indeed, many in corporate India feel that the separation is not desirable — that the dominant, risk taking shareholder being both the Chairman and Chief Executive of a company gives a greater notion of commitment than otherwise".
UK: the FSA's governance and authorisation advisory panel

Thursday, 26 November 2009
UK: the Walker Review of bank governance - final recommendations published

- Institutional shareholders to sign up to a Stewardship Code, sponsored by the Financial Reporting Council with compliance monitored by the Financial Services Authority (the Code on the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors prepared by the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee will become the Stewardship Code)
- Annual re-election for the chairman of the board
- The chairman of a major bank should be expected to commit a substantial proportion of his or her time, probably around two-thirds, to the business
- An expanded role for the remuneration committee with regard to firm wide remuneration policy and "high end" employees
- Disclosure, within remuneration bands, of the number of "high end" employees (including executive directors)
- Deferral of incentive payments should provide the primary risk adjustment mechanism to align rewards with sustainable performance for executive board members and “high end” employees
- If the remuneration report receives less than 75% of the votes cast the remuneration committee chair should stand for re-election in the following year
- Greater expectations placed on non-executive directors regarding time commitment and tougher scrutiny by the Financial Services Authority
- Banks should have a board level risk committee chaired by a non-executive director
- The chief risk officer should have a reporting line to the risk committee and his or her removal should require board approval
Related video and audio resources: Sir David discussed his recommendations on the Radio 4 Today programme this morning: listen here. The BBC News website has a short video of Sir David discussing remuneration here. A video of Sir David's appearance before the Treasury Committee, where he was questioned on his review, appears here.
Wednesday, 25 November 2009
UK: objecting to a company's registered office address - BIS consultation

UK: notices of auditors leaving office - BIS consultation

- removing the duty to notify audit authorities of an auditor’s departure in some cases where it is of little interest to those authorities;
- removing the duty on the audit authorities to notify the accounting authorities of all auditor departures of which they are informed;
- whether there should be any changes to requirements for information to be provided to investors when auditors leave listed companies;
- removing the need for companies to notify Companies House in certain cases of auditor departure; and
- simplifying the legislation by clarifying definitions.
Labels:
audit,
auditors,
companies act 2006,
companies house,
dbis,
uk
Australia: directors' duty to prevent insolvent trading - draft ASIC guidance

Labels:
asic,
australia,
directors' duties,
insolvency
UK: Lord Myners on corporate governance

The problem is that most shareholders do not believe that they are owners; they do not feel responsible for the functioning or the future of companies in which they hold shares. This has profound consequences. The reality of ‘ownerless corporations’ disadvantages public equity as a form of ownership compared with other models – particularly private equity; it leads to pressure for more regulation to offset the vacuum in engaged oversight and it potentially subserviates and alienates employees who cannot diversify employer risk and find themselves working for companies with ‘here today, gone tomorrow’ owners".
... the investment community needs to take seriously the case for an organisation to promote and further the debate on governance and stewardship. A number of trade associations – the ABI, IMA, NAPF and others – have devoted resources to governance, but their primary role is to further the interest of their members; they mostly speak for the agents rather than investor principals. A strong, well-resourced body speaking solely on behalf of investors (the ultimate clients) would represent a valuable addition to the forces working for better governance and stewardship.I have called before on the fund management industry to endorse and fund such a body, possibly in partnership with a major business school (and endorse it without strings attached)".
Labels:
fund management,
institutional shareholders,
shares,
uk,
voting
Tuesday, 24 November 2009
UK: the Bribery Bill and the failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery

Clause 7(1) provides that the offence is committed where a person associated with the organisation bribes another person intending (a) to obtain or retain business for the organisation or (b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of the organisation's business. A defence is, however, provided in clause 7(2), where the organisation is able to prove that it had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent the bribery. Clause 11(5) provides that the offence is committed irrespective of whether the acts or omissions which form part of the offence take place in the UK or elsewhere.
There is an important difference between the draft Bill and the Bill as introduced in the House of Lords regarding this new offence: the Government has removed the requirement for the prosecution to prove that the bribery took place as a result of negligence by a "responsible person" within the organisation. In its response to the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, the Government explained it change of position:
... the Government agrees that there may be a risk that requiring the prosecution to prove negligence may involve unnecessary complexity and may have the potential to undermine the broad policy objectives of bringing about a shift away from a corporate culture that is more tolerant of bribery and promoting effective corporate anti-bribery procedures".
Monday, 23 November 2009
UK: updated guidance booklets from Companies House

UK: statements of capital under the Companies Act (2006) - BIS consultation

Labels:
companies act 2006,
dbis,
icsa,
statement of capital,
uk
UK: the disclosure of directors' loans in company accounts

Responses to the consultation have now been published (see here - .zip file) along with the Government's response (see here - pdf). The Government proposes, in the short-term, amending the 2006 Act in order to clarify the disclosure required by banks in respect of directors loans, credits and guarantees.
Labels:
banks,
companies act 2006,
director loans,
disclosure,
uk
Friday, 20 November 2009
UK: Scotland: remedies for unfairly prejudicial conduct and the powers of the court

Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 provides, inter alia, that a shareholder can apply to the Court for relief in a situation where a company's affairs are being, or have been, conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to him. Section 996 allows the Court to "make such order as it thinks fit". It is recognised that this gives a court the "widest possible discretion" in the selecting the remedy (Wilson v Jaymarke Estates Ltd 2006 SCLR 510, Lord President (Cullen) at para [12]). However, this does not mean that the court can create new remedies, of a type which it otherwise has no power to grant. Thus, it can select from its armoury of competent remedies the one which it thinks appropriate to a given situation. Obvious examples will be orders for payment, ad factum praestandum and interdict. But, in the absence of an express statutory provision, a court cannot grant a remedy which it has no general power to grant.
The Sheriff Court has no jurisdiction to grant the remedy of reduction of documents (Dobie: Sheriff Court Practice, p 22, under reference to Donald v Donald 1913 SC 274). As distinct from the situation where a statute permits the Sheriff Court to "set aside" a decision or other matter as between the parties to a cause or where reduction ope exceptionis constitutes a defence, reduction of deeds can have a much wider effect. It can affect third parties, over which the Sheriff Court may have no general jurisdiction. In the case of heritable rights, any potential Sheriff Court jurisdiction may rest exclusively in another Sheriffdom. Hence, reduction has tended to be restricted to the Court of Session. It may be that this will change in the future (Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review chapter 4, para 141, recommendation 29) but that is the law at present. The Sheriff's objections to it, however well reasoned in practical terms, cannot change that. In short, the Sheriff Court has no power to grant reduction in a petition under section 994".
Labels:
companies act 2006,
scotland,
uk,
unfair prejudice
Singapore: new governance council + code review

New Zealand: Commission finds lack of transparency in financial statements

... all directors should remember that ensuring financial statements comply with the law is a primary duty of company directors. NZ IFRS have been mandatory in New Zealand since 2007. New Zealand companies have had long enough to comply with NZ IFRS. The standards demand greater transparency and if their financial statements are not fully compliant, then company directors should be concerned that they are failing one of their basic duties to shareholders. Company directors are personally responsible to ensure that financial statements tell an entity's story completely and transparently. They should remember that they can be prosecuted under the Financial Reporting Act if their company publishes non-compliant financial statements. If misleading financial information is published in a prospectus, directors can also face prosecution under the Securities Act".
Thursday, 19 November 2009
UK: the Financial Services Bill - first reading in the House of Commons

- The Council for Financial Stability (clauses 1, 2, 3 and 4).
- The objectives of the Financial Services Authority (clauses 5, 6, 7 and 8).
- The remuneration of executives of authorised persons (clauses 9, 10 and 11).
- Recovery and resolution plans (clause 12).
- Short selling (clause 13).
- The FSA's disciplinary powers (clauses 14, 15, 16 and 17).
- Collective proceedings (clauses 18 and 19).
The clauses concerning remuneration have attracted widespread attention. Clause 9 gives the Treasury the power to make regulations (a form of secondary legislation) regarding the preparation, approval and disclosure of executives' remuneration reports.
Clause 11 will amend the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) through the insertion of new section 139A. Section 139A will require the Financial Services Authority to impose on authorised firms the obligation to have, and to act in accordance with, a remuneration policy. This remuneration policy must be consistent with the effective management of risks and the Implementation Standards for Principles for Sound Compensation Practices issued by the Financial Stability Board on 25 September 2009. Where a remuneration policy is not consistent with these requirements, Section 139A(7) states that the FSA "must take such steps as it considers appropriate to deal with the failure" and in this regard it is specifically given the power to require changes in the remuneration policy.
Section 139A(9) provides that the FSA's rules on remuneration may prohibit individuals from receiving certain types of remuneration, with agreements in contravention of this prohibition being void.
UK: FTSE100 boards and female directors

A lecture with Bob Monks
Wednesday, 18 November 2009
UK: the Financial Services Bill

- Establishing a new statutory Council for Financial Stability (‘the Council’), to replace the Standing Committee, chaired by the Chancellor and comprising the Treasury, Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority.
- Strengthening the Financial Services Authority, including through providing explicit objectives, formalising its international work, and expanding the remit of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme.
- Taking action, nationally and internationally, on remuneration.
- Tougher requirements on systemically important financial firms to set up recovery and resolution plans (ie ‘living wills’), that will make banks safer and easier to wind down in the event of a future crisis.
- Enabling the roll-out of a national money guidance service, to be delivered by a new Consumer Financial Education Body.
- The creation of better routes for consumer redress, including enabling a representative to bring an action through the courts on behalf of a group of consumers, and streamlining the FSA’s powers to order a review of past business and secure compensation if there have been legal or regulatory breaches.
- Banning unsolicited credit card cheques, to prevent financial institutions from encouraging customers to borrow more than they can afford.
Labels:
bank of england,
banks,
financial regulation,
financial services,
fsa,
hm treasury,
remuneration,
uk,
uk fsa
UK: the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors - ISC Code published

- Institutional investors should publicly disclose their policy on how they will discharge their stewardship responsibilities.
- Institutional investors should have a robust policy on managing conflicts of interest in relation to stewardship and this policy should be publicly disclosed.
- Institutional investors should monitor their investee companies.
- Institutional investors should establish clear guidelines on when and how they will escalate their activities as a method of protecting and enhancing shareholder value.
- Institutional investors should be willing to act collectively with other investors where appropriate.
- Institutional investors should have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of voting activity.
- Institutional investors should report periodically on their stewardship and voting activities.
The Financial Times newspaper reports that Lord Myners, the Financial Services Secretary to the Treasury, has welcomed the Code's publication but is nevertheless critical of the self-governance model on which it is based.
Tuesday, 17 November 2009
UK: current economic conditions - challenges for audit committees

The current economic outlook appears to be less depressed than this time last year. However, significant economic risks remain and will present challenges for many audit committees during the 2009/10 reporting season. Past experience shows that insolvencies have increased after the technical end of recessions as companies run out of working capital. Such conditions mean that the next twelve months are likely to be particularly difficult for management and may increase the risk that annual reports and accounts misreport facts and circumstances and contain uncorrected errors and omissions".
Canada: Canadian Securities Administrators decide to maintain current governance regime

We received numerous comments about the timing of the Proposal. A majority of commenters expressed the view that now is not an appropriate time to introduce significant changes to the corporate governance regime in Canada. Commenters pointed out that issuers are currently focused on business sustainability issues in a challenging economic climate, and on the transition to International Financial Reporting Standards. We also received significant comments on a wide range of other matters related to the Proposal. Based on the comments we received, the CSA does not intend to implement the Proposal as originally published. We have concluded that now is not an appropriate time to recommend significant changes to the corporate governance regime.
We are reconsidering whether to recommend any changes to the corporate governance regime. We will publish any proposed changes for comment. They would not be effective until the 2011 proxy season at the earliest. The CSA will provide sufficient advance notice for issuers to adapt their corporate governance practices to fully comply with any revised regime".
Monday, 16 November 2009
UK: Treasury Committee finds serious problems with European Commission's proposals for European financial supervision

Labels:
europe,
financial regulation,
financial services,
uk
UK: Companies House - electronic incorporation

The increase in numbers of incorporations failing to meet the target in October was due to the implementation of the Companies Act 2006 and a variety of factors including: data processing issues; customer and staff lack of familiarity with new requirements; and initial issues with system performance. Steps taken include: assigning resources; identifying and fixing data validation issues; clarifying and communicating policy issues. These steps resulted in incorporations targets being met from 9 October onwards".
Australia: credit rating agencies - regulatory change

UK: Coroners and Justice Bill receives Royal Assent

UK: Supreme Court to hear appeal in de facto director case

Labels:
de facto director,
director,
supreme court,
uk
Friday, 13 November 2009
UK: England and Wales: unfair prejudice - improper accounting and removal of an auditor

In the case, the remuneration of the highest paid director was not, as required, disclosed and had been included in an amount for "administrative expenses". It was argued that this did not matter because a shareholder could have asked a question at an annual general meeting in order to elicit further information. The trial judge rejected this position, observing that (para. [218]):
Transparency demands that the unvarnished truth should be revealed by the accounts, not hidden, and not left to the shareholder to ask questions at a shareholders' meeting".
Although the trial judge found that there was no deliberate plan to conceal the truth from the petitioning shareholder, it was, he observed (para. [224]):
It would appear that this finding was an important factor in the trial judge's finding of unfair prejudice. In reaching this decision, HHJ Purle QC briefly considered the knowledge of accounting to be expected of individual directors (para. [220]):
... readily understandable that the improper accounting should cause her to lose all confidence in the competence and integrity of the board, or (which is probably a more realistic appraisal of the situation) that such possibility that there ever was that she should regain trust and confidence in the board has been destroyed".
It would be wrong to expect individual directors to be on top of the detail of the accounting requirements of successive Companies Acts and allied regulations. It is their duty, however, to read the accounts carefully before their approval and query anything that strikes them as odd, or questionable".
Elsewhere in his judgment, when exploring the extent to which breaches of companies legislation should be unfairly prejudicial, he referred to Section 994(1A) - inserted by Regulation 42 of the Statutory Auditors and Third Country Auditors Regulations 2007 - and which provides that "a removal of a company's auditor from office - (a) on grounds of divergence of opinions on accounting treatments or audit procedures, or (b) on any other improper grounds - shall be treated as being unfairly prejudicial to the interests of some part of the company's members". HHJ Purle QC observed that the effect of Section 994(1A) was that (para. [20]):
[there must] be a finding of unfair prejudice even though the effect of the conduct complained of has no necessary impact on the value of the complaining shareholders' investment. Moreover, a board acting in good faith may genuinely, and correctly, disagree with (say) the accounting treatments, but removal of the auditor on those grounds will be unfairly prejudicial, reflecting the importance the law attaches to absolute standards of behaviour in the accounting process. Whilst this particular provision is new, I regard it as declaratory (except as to its mandatory application) of the kind of conduct that can amount to unfair prejudice, both today, and in a case concerning events before 2008, as this case does. Having said that, it does not follow, even where unfair prejudice is established, that the Court will necessarily grant relief. There will be cases where the Court concludes that the unfair prejudice is not sufficiently serious to justify its intervention, or its intervention may be limited".
USA: NYSE corporate governance commission

The NYSE’s Commission on Corporate Governance will address U.S. corporate governance reform and the overall proxy voting process for publicly traded entities. The Commission will take a comprehensive look at the multitude of issues facing Directors, Management, Stockholders, regulators and other constituencies in the on-going public debate about best practices for corporate governance".
UK: FRC responds to Treasury Committee recommendations

UK: executive pay - NAPF principles

Labels:
chairman,
combined code,
directors' duties,
executive pay,
frc,
napf,
remuneration,
uk
Thursday, 12 November 2009
UK: Scotland: winding-up unregistered companies

There is no recent Scots case law on this issue but I am satisfied that the approach of the English courts is appropriate and I recall that our courts have adopted that approach in applications which have not resulted in written opinions. In similar circumstances Lord Grieve in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Highland Engineering Limited 1975 SLT 203 relied on English case law in his interpretation of the provisions of the Companies Act 1948 in relation to the winding up of unregistered companies and observed that it was desirable that the courts in each jurisdiction should interpret a United Kingdom statute, such as the Companies Act, in the same way. In Marshall, Petitioner (1895) 22 R 697 the First Division used English authority to inform their interpretation of section 199 of the Companies Act 1862".
Labels:
insolvency,
insolvency law,
scotland,
uk,
winding-up
Wednesday, 11 November 2009
USA: Restoring American Financial Stability - discussion draft published by Senate Banking Committee

Labels:
banks,
federal reserve,
financial regulation,
financial services,
sec,
usa
UK: OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises - BIS consults on review's terms of reference

Luxembourg: ALFI Code of Conduct for Luxembourg Investment Funds

Tuesday, 10 November 2009
UK: England and Wales: schemes of arrangement and the meaning of 'creditors'

The court held, in the absence of a statutory definition, that a creditor within Section 895 did not include a beneficiary of property held on trust by the company. Patten LJ, with whom the Master of the Rolls and Longmore LJ agreed, observed (at paras. [59] and [66]):
It is obvious that someone with a purely proprietary claim against the company is not its creditor in any conventional sense of that word. As a matter of ordinary language, a creditor is someone to whom money is owed. The use of this word with that meaning is a long-established and essential part of English company law ... Given that "creditor" is not defined in the legislation, it is inconceivable that Parliament should have used the word in the 2006 Act in any but its literal sense ... A person is the creditor of a company only in respect of debts or similar liabilities due to him from the company. I am not persuaded that Parliament can have intended to allow creditors to be compelled (if necessary) to give up not merely those contractual rights but also their entitlement to their own property held by the company on their behalf".
Update (10 November 2009): the ICLR, as part of its WLR Daily service, has provided a summary of the decision here.
UK: directors, ethics and the FSA

Real reform requires both change to the regulatory rules and change to the industry’s culture. Expressions of acceptable ethical frameworks exist in a variety of guises. There are numerous thoughtfully articulated industry codes. The problem is not so much about defining the ethical framework but rather the issue of identifying and encouraging the right cultures which ensure their application. The FSA believes that such issues are potentially so important to improving governance that we, as the regulator, should try to take them into account. We recognise that there is no single ideal culture across the financial services industry, and that all cultures are likely to have good and bad aspects. Our aim would, therefore, be to seek to facilitate the creation of good cultures and intervene when bad ones seem to be creating unacceptable outcomes.
There are two principal tools at the disposal of the regulator to influence culture: governance systems and people. Going forward, we will be seeking to identify mechanisms for assessing the effectiveness of culture during our risk review process. This would certainly include when assessing board effectiveness, looking at their impact on an institution’s culture. However, I believe the key enabler should be our ‘fit and proper’ regime. We all recognise that culture is driven by individuals and in particular senior executives who: ‘set the tone from the top’. I thus strongly believe that our authorisation regime should seek to make a determination of an executive’s ability to set a strong ethical framework and to foster the right culture".
Labels:
approved persons,
banks,
director,
financial regulation,
financial services,
fsa,
tripartite model,
uk
Monday, 9 November 2009
UK: Audit Inspection Unit reports published

Labels:
audit,
audit inspection unit,
frc,
professional oversight board,
uk
Friday, 6 November 2009
Europe: Commission consultation on access to company registers
There is an increasing demand for access to information on companies in a cross-border context, either for commercial purposes or to facilitate access to justice. However, while official information on companies is easily available in the country of their registration, access to the same information from another Member State may be hindered by technical or language barriers. In these circumstances, facilitating cross-border access to official and reliable company information for creditors, business partners and consumers is necessary to ensure an appropriate degree of transparency and legal certainty in the markets all over the EU. To achieve this, the cross-border cooperation of business registers is indispensable.
Efficient cross-border cooperation between the registers is not only essential for a smooth functioning of the Single Market. It also significantly reduces the costs for companies operating cross-border. ... The existing voluntary cooperation between business registries is, however, not enough. There is a need for enhanced cooperation between them. ... This Green Paper describes the existing framework and considers possible ways forward to improve access to information on businesses across the EU and more effective application of the company law directives".
Responses to the green paper should be made here.
Thursday, 5 November 2009
USA: shareholder voting - SEC chairman speech

The proxy statement is crucial to our system of corporate governance. It is the only communication a company makes that is specifically addressed to, and intended for, shareholders. It is where shareholders discover who the nominees are for board elections. It is where shareholders can submit proposals on important company matters, including governance, for consideration by their fellow shareholders. In other words, it is where shareholders can formally and regularly participate in the governance of the corporation they own.
With over 800 billion shares being voted every year at over 7,000 company meetings, it is imperative that our proxy voting process work — starting with the quality of proxy disclosure and continuing through to the accuracy of the annual meeting voting results. That is why we are undertaking a series of initiatives related to the fundamental goal of enhancing the system through which shareholders exercise their franchise. Many of these are admittedly controversial. In fact, they raise difficult legal, philosophical and logistical issues that have derailed previous efforts at reform. But, time has not made these issues go away, and the failure to reform the shareholder voting process in the past has, in my view, affected company and board responsiveness to shareholder concerns".
Labels:
director,
sec,
shareholder rights,
usa,
voting
Wednesday, 4 November 2009
UK: internal audit services/extended assurance services - FRC advises caution

The FRC believes it is important that audit firms and their clients should be aware of the steps being taken and may want to be cautious before entering into arrangements which stretch the internal/external audit boundary, not least because it could prove to be inconvenient and/or costly to change such arrangements should the outcome of the FRC’s work be that the Ethical Standards are changed in a way that affects the provision of such services".
UK: corporation tax, small companies' rate - proposed reform to the associated companies' test

... is to provide a test that retains those aspects of the current test that work well within a new test that attributes rights held between linked persons only in circumstances where actual links between the companies make it appropriate to do so. Put broadly, the new test seeks to ensure that companies cannot be associated by an attribution of rights by mere ‘accident of circumstance’".
Poland: European Commission refers Poland to the ECJ

The Act grants the State special rights - including a right of veto in respect of important management decisions - in thirteen Polish companies in the copper ore mining, media/audiovisual, railway infrastructure, electricity, gas and petroleum, motor spirits and diesel oil sectors. Further information is available here.
Tuesday, 3 November 2009
UK: Sir David Walker appears before the Treasury Committee

Labels:
banks,
financial regulation,
financial services,
uk,
walker review
UK: the Companies’ Remuneration Reports Bill

The Parliamentary timetable is such that the Bill will not become law. Prorogation takes place on 12 November and a new session of Parliament begins on 18 November with the State Opening of Parliament and the Queen's Speech. The Bill cannot be carried forward and would have to be reintroduced in the new session.
Labels:
disclosure,
executive pay,
remuneration,
reporting,
uk
Monday, 2 November 2009
Australia: improving the protection provided to whistleblowers

Information from whistleblowers can make an invaluable contribution to the protection of investor interests and the preservation of market integrity. However, whistleblowers must be shielded from the risks they face in coming forward. Currently, corporate whistleblowers are protected under Part 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 2001. However, these protections have been in place since 2004 and only four whistleblowers have felt safe enough using them to provide information to ASIC. 'I am concerned that the existing protections for corporate whistleblowers contain fundamental shortcomings,' Mr Bowen said".
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