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50 jurisdictions are included: all 38 OECD countries and Argentina, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and South Africa.
Ontario law rejects a “group enterprise theory” under which related corporations that operate closely would, by that very fact, be considered to jointly own their businesses or be liable for each other’s obligations. Although the group might, from the standpoint of economics, appear as a unit or single enterprise, the legal reality of distinct corporations governs ... The common employer doctrine does not involve piercing the corporate veil or ignoring the separate legal personality of each corporation. It imposes liability on companies within a corporate group only if, and to the extent that, each can be said to have entered into a contract of employment with the employee ... Thus, consistent with the doctrine of corporate separateness, a corporation is not held to be a common employer simply because it owned, controlled, or was affiliated with another corporation that had a direct employment relationship with the employee. Rather, a corporation related to the nominal employer will be found to be a common employer only where it is shown, on the evidence, that there was an intention to create an employer/employee relationship between the individual and the related corporation ...".
Whilst there is good evidence to suggest that CEO performance targets do influence firm performance in a manner consistent with increasing CEO payout, it is much less clear that CEOs are influencing firm performance (and therefore their pay) by changing investment. There is some evidence of such investment decisions amongst certain firms, but less clear evidence of this behaviour across the wider FTSE All-Share group. We note that the latter finding does not necessarily mean that CEO pay is correctly set in most large firms. Indeed, one reason why there is little need for CEOs to reduce investment to hit the threshold payout could be that threshold targets are too easy to hit. Still, the evidence does not suggest a systematic problem with executive pay causing underinvestment".