UK: England and Wales: FCA notices - third party rights and identification

The Supreme Court gave judgment earlier today in Financial Conduct Authority v Macris [2017] UKSC 19. A press summary is available here (pdf). At issue was whether an individual, Mr Macris, had been identified in penalty notices given to his former employer. Individuals identified in such notices are given certain 'third party' rights under section 393 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, including receiving a copy of the notice and the right to make representations about its contents. Mr Macris had been JP Morgan's International Chief Investment Officer and whilst the notices did not name him they were critical of JP Morgan's Chief Investment Office in London and New York.

The Court of Appeal (see [2015] EWCA Civ 490) and Upper Tribunal (see [2014] UKUT B7 (TCC)) held that Mr Macris had been identified. The Supreme Court has held, by a majority of 4 to 1, that Mr Macris had not been identified. The lead judgment was delivered by Lord Sumption and he observed (at para. [11]):

In my opinion, a person is identified in a notice under section 393 if he is identified by name or by a synonym for him, such as his office or job title. In the case of a synonym, it must be apparent from the notice itself that it could apply to only one person and that person must be identifiable from information which is either in the notice or publicly available elsewhere. However, resort to information publicly available elsewhere is permissible only where it enables one to interpret (as opposed to supplementing) the language of the notice. Thus a reference to the “chief executive” of the X Company may be elucidated by discovering from the company’s website who that is. And a reference to “CIO London Management” would be a relevant synonym if it could be shown to refer to one person and that person so described was identifiable from publicly available information. What is not permissible is to resort to additional facts about the person so described so that if those facts and the notice are placed side by side it becomes apparent that they refer to the same person".