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Note - a revised edition of the NHF code of governance was published earlier this year: see here (pdf).
We will give institutional investors a duty to act in the best interests of ordinary savers and to prioritise the long-term growth of the companies they invest in. We will change takeover rules to strengthen the role of long term investors by restricting voting to those already holding shares when a bid is made, and strengthen the public interest test to protect the UK’s science and research base. Everybody supports reward for outstanding achievement. Labour will improve the link between executive pay and performance by simplifying pay packages, putting employee representation on remuneration committees and requiring investment and pension fund managers to disclose how they vote on pay and other issues".
A particular item of information can be used by a reasonable investor as one of the grounds for his investment decision and, accordingly, satisfy the condition laid down in Article 1(2) of that directive [Directive 2003/124/EC], even though it does not make it possible to determine the movement in a given direction of the prices of the financial instruments concerned. ... The increased complexity of the financial markets makes it particularly difficult to evaluate accurately the direction of a change in the prices of those instruments, as was stated in recital 1 to Directive 2003/124, which refers to several factors likely to affect those prices in a given situation. In those circumstances — which can lead to widely differing assessments, depending on the investor — if it were accepted that information is to be regarded as precise only if it makes it possible to anticipate the direction of a change in the prices of the instruments concerned, it would follow that the holder of that information could use an uncertainty in that regard as a pretext for refraining from making certain information public and thus profit from that information to the detriment of the other actors on the market.".A summary of the court's opinion is available here (pdf).
At the heart of this case lies the role of the statutory auditor. That role is, I think, without close analogy. Its peculiar characteristics derive from the nature of the public limited liability company. The members, or shareholders, of the company are its owners. But they are too numerous, and in most cases too unskilled, to undertake the day-to-day management of that which they own. So responsibility for day-to-day management of the company is delegated to directors. The shareholders, despite their overall powers of control, are in most companies for most of the time investors and little more. But it would, of course, be unsatisfactory and open to abuse if the shareholders received no report on the financial stewardship of their investment save from those to whom the stewardship had been entrusted. So provision is made for the company in general meeting to appoint an auditor … whose duty is to investigate and form an opinion on the adequacy of the company's accounting records and returns, and the correspondence between the company's accounting records and returns and its accounts … The auditor has then to report to the company's members (among other things) whether in his opinion the company's accounts give a true and fair view of the company's financial position … In carrying out his investigation and in forming his opinion the auditor necessarily works very closely with the directors and officers of the company. He receives his remuneration from the company. He naturally, and rightly, regards the company as his client. But he is employed by the company to exercise his professional skill and judgment for the purpose of giving the shareholders an independent report on the reliability of the company’s accounts and thus on their investment".