
Thursday, 28 February 2013
UK: Government consults on company law changes - company names and micro-entity financial reporting

Wednesday, 27 February 2013
UK: England and Wales: multiple derivative actions not abolished by the Companies Act 2006

I have come on balance to the conclusion that the 2006 Act did not do away with the multiple derivative action. My reasons follow. First, there was before 2006 a common law procedural device called the derivative action by which the court could permit a person or persons with the closest sufficient interest to litigate on behalf of a company by seeking for the company relief in respect of a cause of action vested in it. Those persons would usually be a minority of the company's members, but might, if the company was wholly owned by another company, be a minority of the holding company's members. These were not separate derivative actions, but simply examples of the efficient application of the procedural device, designed to avoid injustice, to different factual circumstances. In 2006 Parliament identified the main version of that device, namely where locus standi is accorded to the wronged company's members, labelled it a "derivative claim" and enacted a comprehensive statutory code in relation to it. As a matter of language, section 260 applied Chapter 1 of Part 11 only to that part of the old common law device thus labelled, leaving other instances of its application unaffected. Applying the well established relevant principle of construction, Parliament did not expressly abolish the whole of the common law derivative action in relation to companies, even though by implication from the comprehensiveness of the statutory code it did do so in relation to derivative claims by members (as defined) of the wronged company. Beyond that, the assertion that the remainder of the common law device was abolished fails because abolition was neither express nor a clear or necessary implication.Update (28 February 2013) - a summary of the judgment has been provided by the ICLR: see here. Update (14 February 2014) - the conclusion and reasoning of Briggs J was endorsed yesterday by Mr Justice David Richards in Abouraya v Sigmund & Ors [2014] EWHC 277 (Ch).
Labels:
derivative action,
england and wales,
shareholder rights,
uk
UK: Competition Commission publishes full provisional findings report for statutory audit market inquiry

Labels:
audit,
audit committee,
auditors,
competition commission,
shareholder,
uk
UK: England and Wales: Law Commission to examine fiduciary duty in the investment context

Labels:
england and wales,
fiduciary,
kay review,
shareholder,
uk
Tuesday, 26 February 2013
UK: Lord Turner on global financial and Eurozone reform

Labels:
banks,
credit institution,
europe,
financial regulation,
financial services,
uk,
uk fsa
Monday, 25 February 2013
Europe: FSA update on CRD IV implementation

Friday, 22 February 2013
UK: audit market not serving shareholder interests says Competition Commission

A summary of the Commission's preliminary findings is available here (pdf) and the full preliminary findings report will be published shortly. Possible remedies are outlined and include mandatory tendering, mandatory rotation and greater shareholder engagement: see here (pdf). The following features of the market have been identified by the Commission:
- Barriers to switching: [i] Companies face significant hurdles in comparing the offerings of an incumbent firm with those of alternative suppliers other than through a tender process, [ii] It is difficult for companies to judge audit quality in advance due to the nature of audit; [iii] Companies and firms invest in a relationship of mutual trust and confidence from which neither will lightly walk away as this means the loss of the benefits of continuity stemming from the relationship.
- Company management face significant opportunity costs in the management time involved in the selection and education of a new auditor.
- Mid Tier firms face experience and reputational barriers to expansion and selection in the FTSE 350 audit market.
- Auditors have misaligned incentives, as between shareholders and company management, and so compete to satisfy management rather than shareholder demand, where the demands of executive management and shareholders differ.
- Auditors face barriers to the provision of information that shareholders demand (in particular from the reluctance of company management to permit further disclosure).
Labels:
audit,
competition commission,
shareholder,
uk
UK: PIRC recommends opposition to all new long-term incentive plans

Thursday, 21 February 2013
UK: FSA responds to to Treasury Committee report on LIBOR

Labels:
approved persons,
banks,
fsa,
fsa handbook,
libor,
uk,
uk fsa
Europe: Consultation on Principles for Benchmarks-Setting Processes - responses published

Wednesday, 20 February 2013
Europe: IMF discussion note on the banking union

Tuesday, 19 February 2013
Europe: ESMA recommends EU Code of Conduct for Proxy Advisors

Maldives: the Capital Market Development Authority's Corporate Governance Code and Principles

Netherlands: compliance with the corporate governance code

Isle of Man: Treasury begins consultation on company law consolidation and reform

An overview of the consolidation and proposed changes is available here (pdf). The draft Bills are available here. A table of derivations is available and this usefully identifies new provisions: see here (pdf). Amongst the changes being proposed is the codification of directors' duties (along the same lines as the UK's Companies Act 2006) and the introduction of a statutory procedure for bringing a derivative claim on behalf of the company.
Labels:
derivative action,
director,
directors' duties,
isle of man
Monday, 18 February 2013
IAASB consults on audit quality framework

Friday, 15 February 2013
Australia: ASIC consults on proposals to strengthen debenture regulation

Jersey: capital maintenance, reduction of capital and the protection of creditors

We reiterate that the 2008 amendments do not remove the duty of the Court to have regard to the interests of creditors in relation to any reduction of capital. The sole effect of the 2008 amendments is that, where the reduction effectively transfers funds from a capital account such as a share premium account (from which distributions may be freely made under Article 115 subject only to the solvency requirement) to a non-capital account (from which distributions may be made on exactly the same basis), it is hard to envisage the Court concluding that creditors may be prejudiced or that any other measure to protect creditors is required. We emphasise however that these observations apply only to a reduction of this nature. Where any other form of reduction is proposed, the Court may still require measures to be taken to satisfy it that creditors will not be prejudiced by the reduction.
Labels:
capital maintenance,
creditor,
jersey,
share premium
Europe: trends, risk and vulnerability in securities markets - ESMA report published

Europe: Commission publishes proposed FTT Directive

Labels:
europe,
european commission,
financial transaction tax,
tax
Thursday, 14 February 2013
UK: recommendations on effective internal audit in the financial services sector

Germany: corporate governance code amendments now available in English

Wednesday, 13 February 2013
UK: Supreme Court holds that extended warranty contracts were contracts of insurance

A summary of the court's decision is available here (pdf). A summary was also delivered by Lord Sumption (see below):
Labels:
financial services and markets act 2000,
fsa,
insurance,
uk,
uk fsa
FSB peer review report on risk governance

Tuesday, 12 February 2013
Europe: ESMA publishes final guidelines on remuneration of alternative investment fund managers

Labels:
aifm directive,
aifmd,
europe,
hedge fund,
remuneration,
remuneration committee
Monday, 11 February 2013
UK: CEO pay - High Pay Centre report describes global talent pool argument as 'self-serving myth'

Labels:
chief executive,
director,
executive pay,
high pay centre,
remuneration,
uk
Europe: Commission consultation on benchmarks - responses published

UK: England and Wales: land-banking and collective investment schemes

"I accept that a (mis)understanding or expectation held by only one person involved in a matter does not amount to an "arrangement" about it. But there can be an "arrangement" without both (or all) parties sharing an intention or expectation (just as a person can make a contract without intending to keep it). The FSA's case, that I have upheld, is not that there would be arrangements if investors simply leapt to their own understanding about their investments or misunderstood what they were being told: it is that the investors' understanding was based, and reasonably based, on what they were told by Asset Land's representatives. Thus, arrangements were made even if Asset Land had no intention of acting in accordance with them and even if their representatives knew this when they made the arrangements. Mr Coppel accepted that a fraudulent scheme can be an arrangement, but explained this on the basis that the parties to it have "mutual expectations", the fraudulent party expecting the innocent party to adhere to it and the innocent party likewise expecting the fraudulent party to do so. I reject that argument; the parties to a fraudulent scheme do not have an arrangement because of such mutual expectations or because of any subjective expectations or intentions, but because of what they have arranged objectively."Update (13 February 2013): a summary of the case, provided by the ICLR, is available here.
Friday, 8 February 2013
UK: Supreme Court to give judgment in Digital Satellite Warranty case next week

Labels:
financial regulation,
financial services,
fsa,
insurance,
supreme court,
uk fsa
UK: Remuneration Principles for Building and Reinforcing Long-Term Business Success

- Management should make a material long-term investment in shares of the businesses they manage.
- Pay should be aligned to long-term success and the desired corporate culture throughout the organisation.
- Pay schemes should be simple, understandable for both investors and executives, and ensure that rewards reflect long-term returns to shareholders.
- Remuneration committees should fully explain and justify how their decisions operate to deliver long-term business success.
Labels:
directors remuneration,
executive pay,
remuneration,
uk
Denmark: Committee consults on new and simplified governance recommendations

Thursday, 7 February 2013
Europe: protecting the financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing

UK: Insolvency Service inquiry - BIS Committee publishes report

Labels:
director,
directors disqualification,
insolvency,
uk
Wednesday, 6 February 2013
UK: Supreme Court judgment in VTB Capital (piercing the corporate veil and other matters)

Germany: Commission proposes changes to Corporate Governance Code

Tuesday, 5 February 2013
UK: The FInancial Services (Banking Reform) Bill - First reading in House of Commons

UK: FRC consults on revisions to the content of the auditor's report on financial statements

Monday, 4 February 2013
UK: structural reform of the banking sector and the electrification of the ring-fence

South Africa: introducing twin peaks financial regulation

Friday, 1 February 2013
UK: introducing the new financial regulatory structure - the Financial Services Act 2012 (Transitional Provisions) (Rules and Miscellaneous Provisions) Order 2013

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