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Thursday, 31 March 2011
USA: SEC adopts remuneration committee rules
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Germany: board diversity and DAX30 companies
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UK: the Bribery Act (2010) - guidance for prosecutors
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UK: England and Wales: no proprietary claim over sale proceeds
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It seems to me that there is a real case for saying that the decision in Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 is unsound. In cases where a fiduciary takes for himself an asset which, if he chose to take, he was under a duty to take for the beneficiary, it is easy to see why the asset should be treated as the property of the beneficiary. However, a bribe paid to a fiduciary could not possibly be said to be an asset which the fiduciary was under a duty to take for the beneficiary. There can thus be said to be a fundamental distinction between (i) a fiduciary enriching himself by depriving a claimant of an asset and (ii) a fiduciary enriching himself by doing a wrong to the claimant. Having said that, I can see a real policy reason in its favour (if equitable accounting is not available), but the fact that it may not accord with principle is obviously a good reason for not following it in preference to decisions of this court.
In my view, Lewison J [the trial judge] was right to reject [the company's] proprietary claim to the proceeds of sale of the Shares. It is true that the decisions in Reid [1994] 1 AC 324, Sugden v Crossland (1856) 2 Sm & G 192, and (at least arguably) Re Caerphilly Colliery Company (Pearson's case) (1877) LR 5 Ch D 336 go the other way. However, there is a consistent line of reasoned decisions of this court (two of which were decided within the last ten years) stretching back into the late 19th century, and one decision of the House of Lords 150 years ago, which appear to establish that a beneficiary of a fiduciary's duties cannot claim a proprietary interest, but is entitled to an equitable account, in respect of any money or asset acquired by a fiduciary in breach of his duties to the beneficiary, unless the asset or money is or has been beneficially the property of the beneficiary or the trustee acquired the asset or money by taking advantage of an opportunity or right which was properly that of the beneficiary.
... previous decisions of this court establish that a claimant cannot claim proprietary ownership of an asset purchased by the defaulting fiduciary with funds which, although they could not have been obtained if he had not enjoyed his fiduciary status, were not beneficially owned by the claimant or derived from opportunities beneficially owned by the claimant. However, those cases also establish that, in such a case, a claimant does have a personal claim in equity to the funds. There is no case which appears to support the notion that such a personal claim entitles the claimant to claim the value of the asset (if it is greater than the amount of the funds together with interest), and there are judicial indications which tend to militate against that notion".
Labels:
director,
directors' duties,
england and wales,
fiduciary,
uk
Wednesday, 30 March 2011
UK: the Bribery Act (2010) - guidance and coming into force date
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UK: report published - auditors: market concentration and their role
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- There should be a detailed investigation of the large-firm audit market by the Office of Fair Trading, with a view to an inquiry by the Competition Commission so that all the interrelated issues surrounding concentration, competition and choice can be examined in detail.
- Prudence should be reasserted as the guiding principle of the audit.
- The new framework of banking supervision should provide for the bank audit to contribute more to the transparency and stability of the financial system, in particular through two-way dialogue between auditors and supervisors about the financial health of banks.
...most shareholders appear to care little about a company's choice of auditor. It seems improbable that this apathy will soon be remedied. So measures which rely on shareholder engagement to help lessen audit market concentration are unlikely to be effective".
Labels:
audit,
audit committee,
auditors,
institutional shareholders,
oft,
risk committee,
shareholder,
uk
UK: whither the credit rating industry?
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... rating agencies perform a valuable role, but that the common and often mechanistic reliance on ratings for information, certification and regulatory purposes lies beneath many of the problems observed during the crisis. The policy priority should therefore be to reduce the scope of such reliance, but to the extent that CRAs nevertheless retain a strong influence in financial markets there may also be a case to consider structural measures to directly tackle potential conflicts of interest in the way in which ratings are produced".
Tuesday, 29 March 2011
Isle of Man: consultation on changes to the Financial Services Act 2008
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UK: the Companies Act 2006 (Annual Returns) Regulations 2011 - draft published
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Monday, 28 March 2011
UK: BIS consultation responses - a Long Term Focus for Corporate Britian
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Overall, respondents believe that short-termism exists in UK equity markets but provided little evidence to demonstrate the scale of the consequences for companies and investors. Many respondents noted the decline in the proportion of UK equities held by UK institutional investors (and a corresponding rise in the proportion held by overseas investors and hedge funds), and raised a range of concerns related to this increasing atomisation of ownership of UK companies. However, many respondents also made the point that the UK benefits from investors using a range of strategies, both long-term and short-term ... The majority of respondents agree that executive pay has risen to unacceptable levels in some cases given performance, however they did not agree on the causes or the best methods of mitigation ... There was a mixed response on the issue of whether boards understand effectively the long-term implications of takeovers or communicate these effectively to investors. However, there was not much support for requiring a vote for shareholders in acquiring companies involved in a takeover".Later this year the Government will provide further information about the next stage of its review of corporate governance.
Friday, 25 March 2011
Ireland: Moriarty Tribunal report part II and company law
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Labels:
companies act 2006,
director,
directors' duties,
ireland,
political donations,
uk
France: the AFG corporation governance recommendations 2011
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Labels:
chairman,
chief executive,
code,
director,
france,
lead director
Thursday, 24 March 2011
UK: the Plan for Growth and corporate governance
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- Reducing the number of companies required to be audited and pressing the European Commission to remove the audit requirement for most medium sized companies as part of a revised audit directive (expected, the Government states, in November 2011).
- Changing the law in 2012 to exempt many subsidiaries from producing audited accounts and encouraging the European Commission to exempt the smallest companies from reporting requirements.
- Requesting the Office of Fair Trading to investigate whether clauses in lending agreements made by banks are unfairly restricting competition in the audit market [in this context, the report refers to work by the OECD, available here (pdf)].
- Simplifying the narrative reporting requirements for quoted companies (views will be sought from business by the end of July 2011).
- Modernising the legislative framework governing mutuals.
Labels:
audit,
dbis,
financial reporting,
hm treasury,
mutual,
oft,
uk
Wednesday, 23 March 2011
Ireland: Central Bank consults on fit and proper regime
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Tuesday, 22 March 2011
UK: the FSA's 2011/12 business plan published
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Labels:
bank of england,
banks,
europe,
financial regulation,
financial services,
fsa,
uk fsa
UK: Takeover Panel consults on Code amendments
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- Increase the protection for offeree companies against protracted “virtual bid” periods by requiring potential offerors to clarify their position within a short period of time;
- Strengthen the position of the offeree company by [i] prohibiting deal protection measures and inducement fees other than in certain limited cases; and [ii] clarifying that offeree company boards are not limited in the factors that they may take into account in giving their opinion and recommendation on an offer;
- Increase transparency and improve the quality of disclosure by [i] requiring the disclosure of offer-related fees; and [ii] requiring the disclosure of the same financial information in relation to an offeror and the financing of an offer irrespective of the nature of the offer;
- Provide greater recognition of the interests of offeree company employees by [i] improving the quality of disclosure by offerors and offeree companies in relation to the offeror’s intentions regarding the offeree company and its employees; and [ii] improving the ability of employee representatives to make their views known.
Labels:
director,
directors' duties,
employee,
takeover,
takeover code,
takeover panel,
uk
Monday, 21 March 2011
New Zealand: securities law reform and criminal liability for serious breaches of directors' duties
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- section 131 (act in good faith and in what the director believes to be the best interests of the company);
- section 135 (avoid carrying on the business of the company in a manner likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss to the company’s creditors);
- section 136 (not to incur an obligation unless the director believes at that time on reasonable grounds that the company will be able to perform the obligation when it is required to do so).
Friday, 18 March 2011
UK: financial crime debate in the House of Lords
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One of the questions asked by my noble friend Lady Williams concerned responsibility. Responsibility for implementation [of the Bribery Act (2010)] is with my right honourable friend the Justice Secretary, who is concerned to ensure that the Act is implemented in a way that tackles bribery effectively but avoids imposing costs or uncertainty on business and certainly does not make this another gold mine for lawyers advising on either implementing or picking up the consequences of the Act. It is the intention of my right honourable friend and the Government to publish guidance shortly. Implementation of the Act will follow publication after three months, in order to give businesses time to prepare themselves. On the other question about responsibility, I can confirm that enforcement of the legislation will be a matter for the Serious Fraud Office and the police".
Labels:
bribery,
bribery act 2010,
corporate bribery,
financial crime,
financial services,
tax,
uk
Thursday, 17 March 2011
UK: Rio Tinto's business review - FRRP secures greater environmental disclosure
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Wednesday, 16 March 2011
UK: the Financial Services (Regulation of Derivatives) Bill
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Labels:
derivatives,
disclosure,
financial reporting,
uk
Tuesday, 15 March 2011
UK: the Hutton Review of Fair Pay in the Public Sector
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Monday, 14 March 2011
UK: England and Wales: the Re Duomatic principle in the Court of Appeal
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In Schofield the Court of Appeal held that the Re Duomatic principle did not apply in order to treat as valid and effective a meeting at which a director (and holder of 0.1% of he company's shares) was removed from office. There was, the court held, no unqualified, objective agreement by this director qua shareholder with regard to the validity of the meeting.
Labels:
director,
duomatic principle,
england and wales,
shareholder,
uk
Friday, 11 March 2011
Europe: related party transactions - ECGF statement
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UK: the Stewardship Code
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Thursday, 10 March 2011
UK: the auditor's contribution to prudential regulation - feedback on FSA discussion paper
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While recognising that this may be exacerbated by the fact that it is often difficult to identify in retrospect whether auditors have been sufficiently sceptical, we have each held or will hold separate meetings with individual audit firms to explain the specific matters that led to our conclusions. Our concerns include whether there was sufficient challenge in relation to particular judgements and whether scepticism is adequately embedded in the audit firms’ processes and training ... We recognise that accounting estimates are the responsibility of management, not auditors. Our concern is about circumstances where auditors do not sufficiently consider whether there are alternatives not considered by management and therefore do not challenge whether management are making the most appropriate judgements ... We acknowledge that professional scepticism is a particular mindset and therefore that direct evidence of its exercise, or otherwise, may be hard to observe after the event and is often circumstantial. Going forward, we believe it is important that our focus is on improving confidence that an appropriate degree of scepticism will be applied consistently by auditors".Elsewhere the FSA states its belief that it can enhance the effectiveness of audit committees through engaging with them on accounting and financial reporting issues to a greater extent. The FSA also states that it will soon publish a policy statement setting out proposals for final rules the objective of which is to improve the quality and consistency of auditors’ client asset reports.
Labels:
audit,
audit committee,
auditors,
financial regulation,
fsa,
uk,
uk fsa
UK: auditor scepticism - APB feedback statement on discussion paper
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- Ensuring that there is a consistent understanding of the nature of professional scepticism and its role in the conduct of an audit.
- Reviewing ISAs (UK&I) for possible ambiguities in relation to the nature and importance of professional scepticism, and proposing such changes as may be needed to make sure the position is clear.
- Reviewing ISQC (UK&I) 1 to ensure that it has sufficient requirements and guidance relating to the need for firms to have appropriate policies and procedures for promoting the competencies that underlie professional scepticism.
- Considering how the application of scepticism can be made more transparent.
- Considering, with other parts of the FRC, whether there is a need for guidance on the approach to be taken by auditors when considering the presentation in the financial statements of matters that have been the subject of significant challenge by auditors.
Wednesday, 9 March 2011
UK: England and Wales: piercing the veil of incorporation
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There is in my judgment no good reason of principle or jurisprudence why the victim cannot enforce the agreement against both the puppet company and the puppet who, all the time, was pulling the strings. ... I accept ... that the puppeteer can be made liable, as a party to the contract, but that as a matter of public policy he cannot enforce the contract".
Tuesday, 8 March 2011
UK: England and Wales: Court of Appeal considers balance sheet test of insolvency under Insolvency Act (1986)
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In my view, the purpose of section 123(2) has been accurately characterised by Professor Sir Roy Goode in Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (third edition). Having referred to section 123(1)(e) as being the "cash flow test" and to section 123(2) as being the "balance sheet test", he said this at para 4-06: 'If the cash flow test were the only relevant test [for insolvency] then current and short-term creditors would in effect be paid at the expense of creditors to whom liabilities were incurred after the company had reached the point of no return because of an incurable deficiency in its assets.'
In my judgment, both the purpose and the applicable test of section 123(2) are accurately encapsulated in that brief passage. Subsection (2) was, in my view, included in section 123 to cover a case where, although it could not be said that a company "is [currently] unable to pay its debts as they fall due" (either because it has no debts which are currently payable, or because it has, or can achieve, the cash flow to pay such debts), it is, in practical terms, clear that it will not be able to meet its future or contingent liabilities. A future or contingent creditor of a company can often claim to be prejudiced by the company using its cash or other assets to pay current creditors or even for some other purpose, but, within bounds, that is an inherent risk in the futurity or contingency of the liability. It is only when it can be said that the company's use of its cash or other assets for current purposes amounts to what may be vernacularly characterised as a fraud on the future or contingent creditors that it can be said that it "has reached the point of no return".
I disagree with ... [the] submission that, when carrying out the exercise required by section 123(2), one simply takes future and contingent liabilities at face amount. "Face amount" is not a term of art ... If a company has a liability for £x in ten years or more, it cannot be right to treat that as a present liability of £x, unless, perhaps, it carries interest at an appropriate rate. The idea that one has to carry out a valuation exercise in relation to future and contingent debts is supported by commercial common sense as well as by the provisions of Rule 13.12(3).
The appellants are on somewhat stronger ground in their contention that the figures in the company's balance sheet, and audited and signed off annual accounts, should be accorded weight in the exercise envisaged by section 123(2). I do not think that it is possible or helpful to describe in general terms the weight to be given to such figures in such an exercise. Clearly, the fact that the figures have been audited and are said to convey a "true and fair" view of the company's position in the opinion of its directors should normally have real force. However, the figures will inevitably be historic, they will normally be conservative, they will be based on accounting conventions, and they will rarely represent the only true and fair view. The court will ultimately have to form its own view as to whether the company in question has reached what Professor Goode described as "the point of no return".
It is not really possible, indeed it would be positively dangerous, to give much further general guidance as to the approach to be adopted by the court when deciding whether section 123(2) applies. The ultimate question, at least normally, is that identified by Professor Goode, and it is to be determined with a firm eye both on commercial reality and on commercial fairness. Clearly, the closer in time a future liability is to mature, or the more likely the contingency which would activate a contingent liability, and the greater the size of the likely liability, the more probable it would be that section 123(2) will apply.
Europe: MEPs vote on short-selling
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Labels:
derivatives,
europe,
financial regulation,
short selling
Europe: European Corporate Governance Forum - February meeting minutes published
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UK: going concern assessment enquiry launched by Financial Reporting Council
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... to identify lessons for companies and auditors addressing going concern and liquidity risks. The Inquiry will draw on the experience of companies and auditors who have had to address these issues in times of difficulty, including during the credit crisis. The Panel of Inquiry will recommend measures, if any, which are necessary to improve the existing reporting regime and related guidance for companies and auditors in relation to these matters".
Ireland: Government proposes binding governance code for listed companies
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We will make good corporate governance the law, not an optional extra, and enact legislation to provide for binding code of practice for corporate governance, which will be obligatory for companies wishing to be listed on Irish stock exchange.
The new Government will re-structure bank boards and replace directors who presided over failed lending practices. We will ensure that the regulator has sufficient powers of pre-approval of bank directors and senior executives. To expedite this change-over we will openly construct a pool of globally experienced financial services managers and directors to be inserted into key executive and non-executive positions in banks receiving taxpayer support".
Labels:
banks,
board of directors,
code,
director,
ireland,
irish stock exchange
Monday, 7 March 2011
UK: audit and accounting - reforms for small companies
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... the UK gains a real advantage from upholding high standards in audit and accounting. But small company rules are stricter in the UK than in almost every else in the developed world. We will change the law to simplify small company audit rules, saving UK companies up to tens of millions in unnecessary audit fees. And we will reduce the costs for subsidiaries of larger companies. Small companies should also benefit from less complex financial reporting requirements; so we welcome the Accounting Standards Board consultation on the reporting requirements for 35,000 medium sized companies".
UK: the Eversheds Board report
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Update: the report is not being made available online - which makes it difficult to comment in detail - but copies can be requested by following the instructions here. Main conclusions have been published here and include the finding that there is a positive correlation between share price performance and the number of independent directors on company boards. The question remains, of course, whether the components identified are causative of company success; correlation does not necessarily imply causation.
Labels:
board diversity,
board of directors,
hong kong,
uk,
usa
Friday, 4 March 2011
UK: creating the Financial Conduct Authority - speech by FSA chief executive
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Labels:
fca,
financial conduct authority,
fsa,
uk,
uk fsa
Thursday, 3 March 2011
UK: board effectiveness - new guidance from the Financial Reporting Council
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Labels:
board of directors,
code,
frc,
higgs,
uk,
uk corporate governance code
New Zealand: the Financial Markets (Regulators and KiwiSaver) Bill
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An interesting part of the Bill is that intended to give the FMA the power to exercise a person's right to bring civil action against a financial market participant, or to take over existing proceedings, where this is considered to be in the public interest. The Commerce Committee concluded that this power should be retained although it noted that it wished to see progress on a class actions Bill.
Europe: increasing the proportion of women on large listed company boards - last chance for self-regulation says EU Justice Commissioner
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Labels:
board diversity,
board of directors,
europe,
non-executive director,
uk
UK: bringing the Bribery Act 2010 into force - no date yet
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... the Government are committed to the implementation of the Bribery Act. We are urgently working on the guidance to commercial organisations to make it practical and useful for legitimate business and trade. After the guidance is published, there will be a three-month notice period before full implementation of the Act".
Wednesday, 2 March 2011
UK: King and Turner on financial regulation reform
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Lord Turner argued that there are good reasons for rejecting the view that all of the increase in financial activity has delivered real economic value; there are, he notes, good reasons to suspect that what has taken place is a mix of value added and rent extraction. He explored the consequences of this conclusion for policy-makers in his speech and, with regard to financial regulation reform, argued that much has been done but more needs to be done, in particular (to quote directly):
- Basel III is a major step forward, but in an ideal world, equity ratios would be set much higher.
- We must understand the drivers of shadow banking and guard against the re-emergence of new risks in new financial mutations.
- Complexity and interconnectedness are important in themselves, and specific regulatory action to offset the externalities created may be required.
- We need to make a reality of macro-prudential oversight and policy response.
Labels:
bank of england,
banks,
financial regulation,
financial services,
fsa,
uk,
uk fsa
Tuesday, 1 March 2011
UK: the taxation of 'disguised remuneration'
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The policy intention is that the new rules should apply to arrangements involving a third party to reward employees and directors which seek to avoid, defer or reduce income tax and NICs and also to arrangements that are used as a tax‐advantaged way to save for retirement, using an employer financed retirement benefit scheme (EFRBS) as an alternative to, or to top up, savings in a registered pension scheme. However, it is not the policy intention that the new rules should apply to deferred rewards which are subject to a specified vesting date and on which income tax under PAYE and NICs will be due, particularly where the reward is subject to meaningful and time‐specific conditions which there is a realistic chance will not be met".
Europe: Commission proposal to connect European business registers
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