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Thursday, 31 December 2009
Sweden: revised corporate governance code
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Wednesday, 30 December 2009
Europe: update on company and financial services law reform
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Despite a revised Presidency compromise agreement, the Competitiveness Council failed to reach agreement on the proposed regulation on a statute for a European Private Company at its meeting of 3 and 4 December. Member States still have concerns regarding the seat of the European Private Company and employee participation in management".
Tuesday, 29 December 2009
India: voluntary corporate governance and social responsibility guidelines published
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The Ministry has also published voluntary corporate social responsibility guidelines: see here (pdf).
Labels:
audit,
audit committee,
auditors,
board of directors,
code,
directors' duties,
india,
whistle blowing
Thursday, 24 December 2009
Japan: corporate governance reform - ACGA statement
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Australia: Productivity Commission report on executive remuneration
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Wednesday, 23 December 2009
UK: England and Wales: unfair prejudice and just and equitable winding-up
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Last Friday judgment was given in Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 (Ch), in which the trial judge, Warren J., considered the Court of Appeal's decision and the relationship between the unfair prejudice remedy (Section 994 of the Companies Act (2006)) and just and equitable winding-up (Section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act (1986)).
Warren J. found the petitioners' allegations of unfair prejudice unfounded but nevertheless recognised that the circumstances may well have founded a successful petition for just and equitable winding-up, although the petitioners had not sought this (see para. [613]). Interestingly, Warren J. also observed, obiter, at para. [584]:
"If the facts are such that a winding up petition on the "just and equitable" ground would succeed but the majority refuse to agree to a winding-up out of court, that conduct might amount to unfair prejudice, the unfairness being to compel the minority to continue to participate in the company when the court would, on this hypothesis, wind it up".
Tuesday, 22 December 2009
USA: facilitating shareholder nominated directors - SEC extends consultation
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UK: proposed changes to the Combined Code - guidance for boards
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Labels:
combined code,
frc,
uk,
uk corporate governance code
Monday, 21 December 2009
UK: FRC consults on its priorities for 2010/11
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Friday, 18 December 2009
UK: England and Wales: client money and CASS7
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The statutory trust created by Chap 7 of the Clients Assets Sourcebook (“CASS 7”) issued by the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) took effect upon the receipt, rather than upon the segregation, of client money. Pending segregation of client money, a firm was obliged to take reasonable steps to ensure that, in relation to client money mixed in its house account with the firm’s own money, clients’ rights in relation to that client money were not put at risk, and the client money was not used for the firm’s own purposes. Client money outside the firm’s segregated accounts did not form part of the client money pool ..."
UK: the Punch Taverns plc AGM - shareholders reject remuneration report
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Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector - Basel Committee consultation paper
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... at the onset of the financial crisis, some banks continued to pay out dividends even though their individual financial condition and the outlook for the sector were deteriorating. Much of this activity was driven by a sense that discretionary reductions in distributions could be seen as a sign of weakness. These actions made individual banks and the sector as a whole weaker. More recently, a number of banks have been quick to reinstate dividends and discretionary bonus payments while the banking sector remains in a fragile state, reducing the resilience of individual banks and the sector as a whole if the recovery falters. To ensure that best practice is adopted by the banking sector as a whole, and to remove the temptation for banks to distribute more in an attempt to signal strength, whilst their financial condition has weakened, the Basel Committee has developed a proposal for capital conservation standards".
Labels:
banks,
basel committee,
dividends,
financial services
Thursday, 17 December 2009
Hong Kong: draft Companies Bill - first phase consultation launched
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Labels:
derivative action,
director,
directors' duties,
hong kong
UK: AIM Rules amendments - remuneration disclosure and electronic communication
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Labels:
aim,
directors remuneration,
disclosure,
executive pay,
uk
Australia: ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations - proposed changes
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USA: SEC adopts enhanced disclosure rules
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The amendments will apply to proxy and information statements, annual reports and registration statements under the Securities Exchange Act (1934) and registration statements under the Securities Act (1933) as well as the Investment Company Act (1940). The new rules will be effective from 28 February 2010. See here for a more detailed overview of the new rules.
Wednesday, 16 December 2009
UK: Scotland: Law Commission report on unincorporated associations
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UK: ABI revised guidelines on executive remuneration
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UK: Walker Guidelines Monitoring Group publishes second report
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There continues to be a high level of commitment to the Guidelines from the private equity industry. In particular, the disclosures made by the private equity firms themselves have improved significantly and all private equity firms covered by the Guidelines met all the requirements without exception. A substantial majority of the portfolio companies reviewed this year made good or acceptable disclosures with only a limited number of exceptions. Overall, the quality of the disclosures made by the sample of portfolio companies reviewed this year is similar to the quality of disclosure found in last year’s review. Similar to last year, the quality of the disclosures varies significantly within the sample with some firms going much further than the requirements".
Labels:
disclosure,
private equity,
uk,
walker guidelines
Tuesday, 15 December 2009
ECGI research newsletter: winter 2009
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Japan: international financial reporting standards
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Labels:
accounting,
financial reporting,
fsa,
ifrs,
japan
The ICGN Global Corporate Governance Principles - revised edition published
A full version of the Principles is not available online but an extract is available here (pdf). Access to to the full version can be obtained by e-mailing Audrey Hart at the ICGN (audrey.hart@icgn.org).
Update (12 January 2010: a full version of the Principles is available here.
Monday, 14 December 2009
UK: developments in corporate governance affecting the responsibilities of auditors of UK companies
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Labels:
audit,
auditing practices board,
auditors,
corporate governance statement,
DTR,
frc,
uk
UK: England and Wales: disqualification, directors' duties and regulatory responsibilities
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It was argued on the directors' behalf that disqualification would be unfair because their breaches of FSA rules - on which the Secretary of State based his case - were unrelated to the general management of the company. The trial judge rejected this argument, observing (at paras. [102] - [103], italics in the original):
The fact that he [the director] has not shown himself unfit to manage any business, or to undertake a different management role, is, like the likelihood or otherwise of offending again ... a matter which goes to leave to be concerned in the management of a company under s. 17 CDDA and to length of disqualification. It is not a matter which goes to disqualification itself. Secondly, there is the simple fact that the abnegation of responsibility by a director is a matter affecting the ability to conduct ordinary corporate governance. A director's failure to ensure that he was sufficiently concerned with relevant responsibilities is a grass roots failure".
Mrs Justice Proudman also accepted the submission, made on behalf of the Secretary of State, that:
... in the case of a FSMA authorised company a director's duty to that company to exercise reasonable care skill and diligence extends to taking all reasonable steps to ensure that the company complies with its regulatory obligations" (para. [9]).
Labels:
directors disqualification,
directors' duties,
england and wales,
fsa,
uk,
uk fsa
UK: Scotland: application for late registration of a charge declined
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The onset of formal insolvency, as a general rule, fixes the position of creditors, who are ranked on the insolvent estate in accordance with their strict legal rights. From then on, the insolvency practitioner holds the company's assets for the benefit of the creditors in accordance with the rights which the general law gives them as to ranking. For the court thereafter to interfere with that ranking would be a serious step. I do not exclude the possibility in exceptional circumstances of the court allowing the late registration of a charge after formal insolvency had commenced, for example where a creditor had been the victim of fraud and especially if the perpetrator stood to gain in the insolvency through the invalidity of the charge. But in the absence of exceptional circumstances, I do not consider that it is just and equitable to interfere with the statutory ranking of creditors on insolvency".
Labels:
administration,
charge,
registration of charges,
scotland,
uk
Friday, 11 December 2009
UK: the Bribery Bill - the failure to prevent bribery by a commercial organisation
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We recognise that there has been considerable debate about what constitutes "adequate procedures" for these purposes. As we indicated in our response to the Joint Committee, the Government agree that guidance should be made available to commercial organisations. We propose that such guidance should be available well in advance of the new offences coming into force. Over the coming months we will develop appropriate guidance, drawing on the expertise of business representatives, Transparency International and others. Among other things, we envisage that the guidance will provide illustrative good practice examples of adequate procedures. While guidance will be in place to assist business, the message from the Bill is clear. The payment of bribes, including facilitation payments, is unlawful. If companies pay them in order to gain a business advantage they run the risk of prosecution. Bribery on any scale cannot and should not be tolerated or condoned".
There is, however no duty on the Government to provide such guidance, a point made by Lord Goodhart during debate (see col. 1091). Lord Henley, the shadow justice minister, offered support for the Bill but stated (at col. 1120):
We have concerns about how the Bill is framed and we will probe, for example how Clause 7 will work in practice. An offence of omission is being created for companies that do not prevent bribery. The defence is vague. We will probe what is meant by 'adequate procedures'. One of the core aims of this legislation must be that it is clear and unambiguous. We have heard representations from businesses that seek assurances that they are not going to be left in difficulties because of the change in the law. A great deal may hinge on what sort of guidance is put in place, rather than on the wording of the Bill, and we will certainly be looking at putting down amendments to elicit more information from the Government on this".
Singapore: Stock Exchange proposes measures to strengthen corporate governance
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UK: the Companies Act 2006 (Substitution of Section 1201) Regulations 2009
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Thursday, 10 December 2009
UK: AIU publishes overview of audit quality inspections
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The AIU considers the overall quality of major public company audit work to be fundamentally sound. For each major firm the AIU has recommended to the relevant Audit Registration Committee that the firm’s registration to conduct audit work be continued. The AIU was generally satisfied with the basis on which significant audit judgments were made on the individual audits reviewed at the firms. It considered that audit procedures had generally been performed to a good or acceptable standard. However, the AIU identified certain areas at each major firm where improvements were in its view needed in order to enhance audit quality".
Wednesday, 9 December 2009
UK: proposed building society governance code - BSA response
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We see this as building on the annotated Combined Code which the BSA already publishes for building societies - and with which there is a high level of compliance".
UK: the pre-budget report: tax, stock lending and a governance code for building societies
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Of particular interest elsewhere in the report are the following announcements (at paras. 3.39 and 3.58):
The FSA has been reviewing the governance and risk management of stock lending in the market. The Government welcomes this work and will work with the FSA and market participants as necessary to help develop thinking in this area.
Following the Walker Review, and the subsequent Financial Reporting Council (FRC) consultation on the Combined Code, the Government proposes the introduction of a specific governance code for building societies and other financial mutuals. The Government will also consider the introduction of a regular independent review of building societies (and other financial mutuals) adherence to the Code".
Tuesday, 8 December 2009
UK: FSA decides not to extend its remuneration code
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Monday, 7 December 2009
Europe: corporate governance in the Member States
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The study found widespread support amongst regulators and institutional shareholders for the 'comply or explain' approach but identified clear scope for improving its operation with regard to the quality of information disclosed and enforcement. A greater role for regulators and statutory auditors is advocated as well as the adoption of a 'comply or explain' code for institutional shareholders regarding the exercise of their voting rights.
The report is accompanied by three appendices: [1] legal analysis by Member State [2] survey on company perceptions of governance codes and [3] methodology. Appendix one contains much useful information and provides a reasonable starting point for further research. However, the UK section is over simplified in places and is, therefore, potentially misleading. For example, the short summary on p. 421 is misleading to the extent that it suggests that all UK incorporated companies are subject to the Combined Code. Moreover, on p. 423, it is stated that that the consent of at least 75% of the shareholders is required to amend the articles of association: this should be at least 75% of votes cast at the relevant shareholders' meeting (see Sections 21 and 283 of the Companies Act 2006). Finally, is it correct to assert, as is done in the conclusion presented on p. 421, that the UK corporate governance framework "ensures that basic standards of corporate governance are maintained throughout all companies incorporated in the UK"?
Friday, 4 December 2009
Norway: Code of Practice for Corporate Governance - revised edition published
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Thursday, 3 December 2009
Europe: new supervisory authorities for financial services - Council agreement
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These new authorities will replace three existing committees of supervisors (CEBS, CEIPOS and CESR) and will comprise representatives from Member States' supervisory authorities. The day to day supervision of individual firms will remain the responsibility of Member States' regulators.
For further information see here (pdf).
For further information see here (pdf).
Labels:
banks,
europe,
financial regulation,
financial services
France: gender equality on listed company boards
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Wednesday, 2 December 2009
UK: the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 2009
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The United Kingdom currently has a wider definition of market abuse than that established in the EU’s 2003 Market Abuse Directive. When the Treasury transposed the Directive, the main challenge was to decide how much change was appropriate to the civil market abuse regime that had been put in place as part of Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) in 2000. The FSMA regime and the Market Abuse Directive cover similar ground but adopt a slightly different approach to prohibiting abusive behaviour. The original FSMA regime defined market abuse in fairly broad terms and then qualified it by the requirement that behaviour is only abusive if it is likely to be regarded as such by a ‘regular user’ of the market. The Directive set out more specific descriptions of the type of behaviour that is to be prohibited.
On balance, it was decided to retain the scope of the existing market abuse prohibitions to the extent that these go beyond the prohibitions in the Directive (the new sections 118(4) and 118(8) of FSMA) but to make them subject to a sunset clause whereby the provisions would expire after a period of three years pending the outcome of a review by HM Treasury to assess whether they remain justified.
It was initially decided to extend the sunset clauses until 31 December 2009 until the outcome of the EU’s review of the Market Abuse Directive became known. This was done in the 2008 Regulations. The EU’s review of the Market Abuse Directive was subsequently delayed. The call for evidence was only launched on 20 April 2009, and the Commission has not yet published proposals to amend the Directive. It has therefore been decided to extend the sunset clauses further until 31 December 2011".
UK: the Financial Services Bill - second reading
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Sir David made a number of recommendations, but I think that we go further than he suggested. We want to consult on regulations for narrower disclosure bands than he proposed, starting with salary packages below the £1 million floor that he suggested. We will consult on that idea, but most people are convinced that far more disclosure is important, because they will then be able to see precise remuneration practices".
Tuesday, 1 December 2009
UK: FRC consultation on changes to the Combined Code
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A copy of the proposed new Code is included in the consultation paper. It contains new sections on leadership and accountability and a greater emphasis is given to the long-term success of the company. For example, the recast preamble/introductory section begins:
The purpose of corporate governance, supported by the Code, is to facilitate efficient, effective and entrepreneurial management that can deliver growth in shareholder value over the longer term".
Amongst the FRC's other proposals are:
- the annual re-election of the chairman or the entire board
- new principles concerning leadership by the chairman and the role, skills and independence of the non-executive directors (including their time commitment)
- board evaluation reviews should be externally facilitated at least every three years
- the chairman should hold regular development reviews with each director
- new principles on the board's responsibility for managing risk.
Monday, 30 November 2009
Europe: corporate governance statements and the auditors' assurance role - FEE discussion paper
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.... despite the range of legal systems, institutional frameworks and traditions, there is considerable convergence across Europe in the elements of national corporate governance codes. Most of these codes are closely related to the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance – either by making explicit reference, or by incorporating the principles within the national code, supplemented by local rules and guidance".
Hong Kong: company law reform
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- the director's duty of skill, care and diligence should be codified
- all companies should have at least one natural person acting as a director
- reduction of capital should be permitted through a court-free procedure involving a solvency test
- the statutory derivative action should be extended to include multiple derivative actions, thereby bringing it in line with the shareholder's common law right to bring an action on behalf of the company following the decision of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Waddington Ltd v Chan Chun Hoo Thomas and others [2008] FACV 15/2007.
Friday, 27 November 2009
India: MCA seeks comments on task force report and recommendations
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Most Indian listed companies are controlled by promoters, often holding over 50 per cent of the voting stock. Indeed, many in corporate India feel that the separation is not desirable — that the dominant, risk taking shareholder being both the Chairman and Chief Executive of a company gives a greater notion of commitment than otherwise".
UK: the FSA's governance and authorisation advisory panel
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Thursday, 26 November 2009
UK: the Walker Review of bank governance - final recommendations published
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- Institutional shareholders to sign up to a Stewardship Code, sponsored by the Financial Reporting Council with compliance monitored by the Financial Services Authority (the Code on the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors prepared by the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee will become the Stewardship Code)
- Annual re-election for the chairman of the board
- The chairman of a major bank should be expected to commit a substantial proportion of his or her time, probably around two-thirds, to the business
- An expanded role for the remuneration committee with regard to firm wide remuneration policy and "high end" employees
- Disclosure, within remuneration bands, of the number of "high end" employees (including executive directors)
- Deferral of incentive payments should provide the primary risk adjustment mechanism to align rewards with sustainable performance for executive board members and “high end” employees
- If the remuneration report receives less than 75% of the votes cast the remuneration committee chair should stand for re-election in the following year
- Greater expectations placed on non-executive directors regarding time commitment and tougher scrutiny by the Financial Services Authority
- Banks should have a board level risk committee chaired by a non-executive director
- The chief risk officer should have a reporting line to the risk committee and his or her removal should require board approval
Related video and audio resources: Sir David discussed his recommendations on the Radio 4 Today programme this morning: listen here. The BBC News website has a short video of Sir David discussing remuneration here. A video of Sir David's appearance before the Treasury Committee, where he was questioned on his review, appears here.
Wednesday, 25 November 2009
UK: objecting to a company's registered office address - BIS consultation
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UK: notices of auditors leaving office - BIS consultation
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- removing the duty to notify audit authorities of an auditor’s departure in some cases where it is of little interest to those authorities;
- removing the duty on the audit authorities to notify the accounting authorities of all auditor departures of which they are informed;
- whether there should be any changes to requirements for information to be provided to investors when auditors leave listed companies;
- removing the need for companies to notify Companies House in certain cases of auditor departure; and
- simplifying the legislation by clarifying definitions.
Labels:
audit,
auditors,
companies act 2006,
companies house,
dbis,
uk
Australia: directors' duty to prevent insolvent trading - draft ASIC guidance
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Labels:
asic,
australia,
directors' duties,
insolvency
UK: Lord Myners on corporate governance
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The problem is that most shareholders do not believe that they are owners; they do not feel responsible for the functioning or the future of companies in which they hold shares. This has profound consequences. The reality of ‘ownerless corporations’ disadvantages public equity as a form of ownership compared with other models – particularly private equity; it leads to pressure for more regulation to offset the vacuum in engaged oversight and it potentially subserviates and alienates employees who cannot diversify employer risk and find themselves working for companies with ‘here today, gone tomorrow’ owners".
... the investment community needs to take seriously the case for an organisation to promote and further the debate on governance and stewardship. A number of trade associations – the ABI, IMA, NAPF and others – have devoted resources to governance, but their primary role is to further the interest of their members; they mostly speak for the agents rather than investor principals. A strong, well-resourced body speaking solely on behalf of investors (the ultimate clients) would represent a valuable addition to the forces working for better governance and stewardship.I have called before on the fund management industry to endorse and fund such a body, possibly in partnership with a major business school (and endorse it without strings attached)".
Labels:
fund management,
institutional shareholders,
shares,
uk,
voting
Tuesday, 24 November 2009
UK: the Bribery Bill and the failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery
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Clause 7(1) provides that the offence is committed where a person associated with the organisation bribes another person intending (a) to obtain or retain business for the organisation or (b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of the organisation's business. A defence is, however, provided in clause 7(2), where the organisation is able to prove that it had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent the bribery. Clause 11(5) provides that the offence is committed irrespective of whether the acts or omissions which form part of the offence take place in the UK or elsewhere.
There is an important difference between the draft Bill and the Bill as introduced in the House of Lords regarding this new offence: the Government has removed the requirement for the prosecution to prove that the bribery took place as a result of negligence by a "responsible person" within the organisation. In its response to the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, the Government explained it change of position:
... the Government agrees that there may be a risk that requiring the prosecution to prove negligence may involve unnecessary complexity and may have the potential to undermine the broad policy objectives of bringing about a shift away from a corporate culture that is more tolerant of bribery and promoting effective corporate anti-bribery procedures".
Monday, 23 November 2009
UK: updated guidance booklets from Companies House
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