Whether or not it be true that the presence of differing kinds of statutory provision in some Acts has inhibited the prosecution of unincorporated associations in their absence, the definition in the Interpretation Act is of general application. To assert that a contrary intention appears from the absence of a specific statutory provision amounts to depriving that definition of its generality. We conclude that the judge was right in his first decision. The prosecution of the club was permissible in law. The definition of ‘person' in the Interpretation Act 1978 applied and no contrary intention appeared.
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1 comment:
The case contains dicta which is both disturbing and questionable: a classic example of judicial hubris. The decision that it is possible to prosecute (whether successfully or not) individual members is correct. It is the assumption (without analysis), e.g. at [3] and[33], that all members of the club were in the same position that is legally dubious. cf., for example, London Association for Protection of Trade v Greenlands [1916] 2 AC 14, at 39; Brown v Lewis (1896) 12 TLR 455.
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