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Tuesday, 31 January 2017
UK: FCA imposes largest ever penalty for anti-money laundering control framework failings
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Labels:
aml,
anti-money laundering,
fca,
money laundering,
uk
Monday, 30 January 2017
OECD Survey of Corporate Governance Frameworks in Asia
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Friday, 27 January 2017
UK: England and Wales: parent company liability for subsidiary company actions
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... even if passages in public documents that state the policies of a group of companies could be construed as being sufficient to establish the presumption of a duty of care on the part of a parent for the acts of its subsidiary, then the words which appear in the Shell documents effectively disclaiming that interpretation would negate that presumption ... [moreover] I do not consider that such a presumption would operate in any event on the basis of such statements. The London Stock Exchange is a Recognised Investment Exchange under UK law, and operates a regulated market. The Exchange must ensure that all securities admitted to trading on its markets, and the dealing in those securities, are conducted in accordance with the relevant legislation (both primary and secondary). That includes complying with certain disclosure standards. It is highly unlikely in my judgment that compliance with such disclosure standards could of itself be characterised as an assumption of a duty of care by a parent company over the subsidiary companies referred to in those statements. There is certainly no authority to this effect and in the absence of any, I would hold that such compliance cannot in itself be a sufficient factor to found a duty of care on the part of a parent holding company."Update (2 February 2017) - the ICLR has provided a summary of the case: see here.
Thursday, 26 January 2017
UK: Finance Bill 2017 - corporate interest and relief for carry forward losses
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Labels:
corporation tax,
interest expense,
loss relief,
tax,
uk
Wednesday, 25 January 2017
UK: England and Wales: restoration of companies to the register and the scope of court directions
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The court's decision is important for two reasons. First, it provides guidance on the granting of limitation directions (e.g., directions of the court concerning the running of limitation periods). The court held that the making of a limitation direction under section 1032(3) required the applicant to show a clear causal link between the dissolution and the failure to bring proceedings within the applicable limitation period. The court therefore rejected as being too low the test that the trial judge had adopted: that there should be a "window of opportunity" in which proceedings might have been brought. Second, the court has confirmed (in what appears to be the first authority where such a direction has been sought) that it has the discretion under section 1032(3) - albeit one that should be exercised with extreme caution - to grant a direction that a petition that had not yet been presented for winding-up the company would be regarded as having been presented on the day the company was struck off. Update (26 January 2017) - the ICLR has published a summary of the decision: see here.
Tuesday, 24 January 2017
Pakistan: an update on the Companies Bill 2016
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Nigeria: suspension of the national code of corporate governance
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Monday, 23 January 2017
UK: reviewing limited partnership law - a call for evidence
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Labels:
england and wales,
limited partnership,
partnership,
scotland,
uk
Friday, 20 January 2017
Egypt: the Egyptian code of corporate governance
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Thursday, 19 January 2017
UK: PLSA publishes updated Corporate Governance Policy and Voting Guidelines
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Labels:
plsa,
remuneration,
remuneration committee,
shareholder,
voting
Wednesday, 18 January 2017
Gibraltar: the Private Foundations Bill 2017
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Tuesday, 17 January 2017
UK: introducing the Private Fund Limited Partnership (PFLP) structure
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The purpose of the Order is to amend the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 to introduce a Private Fund Limited Partnership (PFLP) structure. The structure is intended for private investment funds (i.e., those not authorised to be promoted to retail consumers and structured as limited partnerships).
Monday, 16 January 2017
UK: Ministry of Justice seeks views on the case for new corporate economic crime offences
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Friday, 13 January 2017
India: SEBI guidance note on board evaluation
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Labels:
board evaluation,
board of directors,
india,
sebi
Thursday, 12 January 2017
Switzerland: Ethos publishes updated proxy voting guidelines and corporate governance principles
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Wednesday, 11 January 2017
UK: FRC report - developments in corporate governance and stewardship [and what next for the FRC?]
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It is reported that compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code is high: 90% of FTSE 350 companies report that they comply with all, or all but one of the Code's 54 provisions. Full compliance has risen from 57% to 62% this year. The provision most frequently not complied with is B.1.2, which states that at least half the board, excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be independent.
The report is published in the year in which the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of the Cadbury Committee Code and Report will be marked; it was the Cadbury Committee that gave us 'comply or explain' that has since been a central pillar - indeed, foundation - of the UK's governance framework for large, listed companies since the early 1990s. A great deal has happened since the publication of the Cadbury Report and much has changed in the past year: a new prime minister in the UK who placed governance reform as part of her personal manifesto; a vote to leave the European Union; and two governance reviews are underway (see here and here), instigated for reasons that challenge the effectiveness of aspects of the UK's governance framework and, indeed, the role and effectiveness of the FRC in this regard. It is not, therefore, surprising to see today's FRC development report adopt a tone quite different from the developments report published last year.
Consolidation was the message last year - it was stated that no substantial changes were proposed to the UK Governance Code for the next three years - and no hint was given that the FRC sought wider powers. But from today's report we learn that the FRC "stands ready" to revise the Code; that it has established a Stakeholder Panel to "bring a broader range of perspectives into [its] ... policy-making and work" (the FRC's website does not, however, provide any information about the Panel, its members and the selection/recruitment process); and that the market model's "checks and balances" require reassessment and revitalisation. This is very welcome, against the background of debate about how best to achieve appropriate standards of governance and the extent to which the ethos of encouragement and reflection that 'comply or explain' seeks to promote can (and/or should) coexist with a stronger and wider enforcement role for the FRC.
Tuesday, 10 January 2017
Ireland: new code for community, voluntary and charitable organisations
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Labels:
charity governance code,
code,
ireland,
stewardship
Monday, 9 January 2017
Singapore: MOF/ACRA consultation - AGMs, beneficial ownership and foreign companies seeking domicile
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Labels:
agm,
beneficial ownership,
company register,
domicile,
general meeting,
singapore
Friday, 6 January 2017
Denmark: recommendations on active ownership by institutional investors
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Update (8 February 2017) - a copy of the recommendations in English is now available: see here (pdf).
Thursday, 5 January 2017
Netherlands: Commission report finds high compliance with code
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Wednesday, 4 January 2017
UK: England and Wales: substantial property transactions and the meaning of 'non-cash asset'
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The case concerned the operation of the rules requiring shareholder approval for certain transactions between companies and their directors (or those connected with the directors) involving non-cash assets . The meaning of "non-cash asset" was central and, in this regard, the court held (to quote the opening sentences from the ICLR summary):
As established by the authorities, section 739(2) of the Companies Act 1985 [now section 1163 of the Companies Act 2006, which defines "non-cash asset"] extended to rights that were not proprietary rights, provided that they could still be properly described as rights in or over property. An “interest in property” for the purposes of section 739(1) meant a proprietary interest ... An “interest” in property under section 739 was one that could be defined by reference to proprietary concepts, or at least by concepts that were legally recognisable and enforceable".
Tuesday, 3 January 2017
Australia: attribution, aggregation and unconscionable conduct
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At first instance ([2016] FCA 368) the trial judge held that the knowledge of two bank employees should be aggregated and that the bank had acted unconscionably. The Full Court (Allsop CJ, Besanko and Edelman JJ) unanimously overturned this decision, in an important judgment exploring the scope for aggregation and the meaning of unconscionable conduct.
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