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Friday, 29 July 2016
UK: new code of practice for defined contribution pension schemes
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Labels:
pension scheme,
pensions,
pensions regulator,
trustee,
uk
Thursday, 28 July 2016
UK: FRC publishes revised edition of the UK Audit Firm Governance Code
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Labels:
audit firm governance code,
auditors,
code,
frc,
non-executive director,
uk
Wednesday, 27 July 2016
UK: Supreme Court decision on agency, constructive trusts and insolvency
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There were two issues before the court: when will the law regard the authority of an agent as irrevocable; and, does liability to account as a constructive trustee arise where money is received at a time when the recipient knows that imminent insolvency will prevent the performance of the corresponding obligation? With regard to the latter question, Lord Sumption held that no trust arose and declined to follow the authorities suggesting otherwise including Neste Oy v Lloyd’s Bank Plc [1983] 2 Lloyds Rep 658 and In re Japan Leasing Europe Plc [1999] BPIR 911. Lord Sumption stated (at paras. [26] and [28]):
It is inherent in the statutory scheme of distribution in an insolvency that apparently arbitrary results may follow from the adventitious timing of the commencement of the liquidation, especially in the case of deferred obligations. In principle, an advance payment to a company made before the commencement of the liquidation for an obligation performable afterwards will form part of the company’s estate, notwithstanding that its supervening insolvency means that the obligation will not be performed, at any rate in specie. The payer must prove in the liquidation for damages for the breach of contract. Likewise, a contractor providing goods or services on credit will have to prove in the liquidation for the price if the other party becomes insolvent before paying. The rule is the same for money received for his principal’s account by an agent who becomes insolvent before accounting for it, unless (contrary to the unchallenged finding of the judge in this case) the relations between the parties were such as to make the agent an express trustee of money in his hands. The money will form part of the agent’s insolvent estate, and the principal must prove in the liquidation. In the nature of things, these consequences involve a detriment for the payer, attributable to the timing of the company’s insolvency; and a windfall for the general creditors, since the estate available for distribution will be increased by the payment without being reduced by the cost of performance. Bingham J’s point of departure in Neste Oy was that the recipient of money may be liable to account for it as a constructive trustee if he cannot in good conscience assert his own beneficial interest in the money as against some other person of whose rights he is aware. As a general proposition this is plainly right. But it is not a sufficient statement of the test, because it begs the question what good conscience requires. Property rights are fixed and ascertainable rights. Whether they exist in a given case depends on settled principles, even in equity. Good conscience therefore involves more than a judgment of the relative moral merits of the parties. For that reason it seems to me, with respect, that Bingham J’s observation in Neste Oy that any reasonable and honest director would have returned the sixth payment upon its receipt begs the essential question whether he should have returned it. It cannot be a sufficient answer to that question to say that it would be “contrary to any ordinary notion of fairness” for the general creditors to benefit by the payment. Reasoning of this kind might be relevant to the existence of a remedial constructive trust, but not an institutional one. The observation of the editors of Bowstead and Reynolds and of Nicholas Warren QC in Japan Leasing that a proprietary claim should be recognised whenever the claim is “sufficiently strong and differentiable from other claims” to warrant giving it priority over other claims in an insolvency, seems to me to be open to the same objection."A video recording of Lord Sumption, delivering the court's opinion, is available below (and also here should the embedded video not work):
Labels:
administration,
agency,
constructive trust,
insolvency,
trust,
uk,
winding-up
Pakistan: company law reform - publication of Companies Bill 2016 (final draft) and concept paper on several new provisions
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Labels:
beneficial ownership,
fraud,
money laundering,
pakistan
Tuesday, 26 July 2016
UK: Executive Remuneration Working Group publishes final report and recommendations
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The Financial Reporting Council, in a statement published today, described the Group's report as "thoughtful" and said that it would consider the recommendations concerning the skills and experience of the remuneration committee. The FRC also took the opportunity - perhaps mindful of its position as an advocate for the role of codes and best practice in shaping behaviour, given that further legislation in this area would appear imminent - to say that it welcomed the Government's current focus on improving corporate conduct, pointing in this respect to its recent report on corporate culture and the role of boards.
Labels:
directors remuneration,
executive pay,
frc,
remuneration committee,
uk
Italy: Governance Committee meets - no update to the Code but areas for investigation identified
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Monday, 25 July 2016
UK: England and Wales: dispositions of company property after the commencement of winding-up
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The true position is that, save in exceptional circumstances, a validation order should only be made in relation to dispositions occurring after presentation of winding up petition if there is some special circumstance which shows that the disposition in question will be (in a prospective application case) or has been (in a retrospective application case) for the benefit of the general body of unsecured creditors, such that it is appropriate to disapply the usual pari passu principle."
Labels:
creditor,
insolvency,
insolvency act 1986,
pari passu,
uk,
winding-up
Friday, 22 July 2016
USA: updated CalSTRS Corporate Governance Principles
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Labels:
board of directors,
calstrs,
climate change,
cyber security,
proxy voting,
risk,
risk management,
usa
Thursday, 21 July 2016
USA: 'Commonsense corporate governance principles' published
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Wednesday, 20 July 2016
UK: FRC report - corporate culture and the role of boards
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Labels:
board of directors,
corporate culture,
frc,
uk
Tuesday, 19 July 2016
UK: Amending the Takeover Code - four instruments published
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Monday, 18 July 2016
Luxembourg: company law reform - update
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Friday, 15 July 2016
UK: FRC report - developments in audit 2015/16
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Labels:
audit,
auditors,
frc,
statutory audit directive,
uk
Thursday, 14 July 2016
UK: Law Commission report - consumer prepayments on retailer insolvency
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- Regulating Christmas and similar savings schemes, which the Commission believes pose a particular risk to vulnerable consumers.
- Introducing a general power for Government to require prepayment protection in sectors which pose a particular risk to consumers.
- Giving consumers more information about obtaining a refund through their debit or credit card issuer.
- Making a limited change to the insolvency hierarchy, to give a preference to the most vulnerable category of prepaying consumers (their claims would rank below preferential claims from employees and above those of floating charge holders).
- Making changes to the rules on when consumers acquire ownership of goods.
Labels:
england and wales,
insolvency,
law commission,
liquidation,
uk,
winding-up
Wednesday, 13 July 2016
Burma: New Companies Law - post-consultation draft published
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Labels:
burma,
directors' duties,
myanmar,
shareholder rights
Tuesday, 12 July 2016
UK: England and Wales: the interests of creditors and reductions of capital supported by a solvency statement
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... the opinion that the directors must form is not whether, if calamity were to strike on some or all fronts, the company might be unable to pay its debts nor is it whether the court would have jurisdiction to wind up the company under section 123 of the Insolvency Act on a petition issued on the day the solvency statement was signed. The test is not a technical one but a straightforward one applying the words of the section. The directors must look at the situation of the company at the date of the statement and, taking into account contingent or prospective liabilities, form an opinion as to whether the company is able to pay its debts".With regard to the circumstances in which directors are required at common law to consider or act in the interests of the creditors, Mrs Justice Rose stated (paras. [477] - [488]).
Having reviewed the authorities I do not accept that they establish that whenever a company is 'at risk' of becoming insolvent at some indefinite point in the future, then the creditors' interests duty arises unless that risk can be described as 'remote'. That is not what the cases say and there is no case where, on the facts, the company could not also be accurately described in much more pessimistic terms, as actually insolvent or 'on the verge of insolvency', 'precarious', 'in a parlous financial state' etc. The essence of the test is that the directors ought in their conduct of the company's business to be anticipating the insolvency of the company because when that occurs, the creditors have a greater claim to the assets of the company than the shareholders".
Monday, 11 July 2016
UK: new prime minister outlines governance reforms
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I want to see changes in the way that big business is governed. The people who run big businesses are supposed to be accountable to outsiders, to non-executive directors, who are supposed to ask the difficult questions, think about the long-term and defend the interests of shareholders. In practice, they are drawn from the same, narrow social and professional circles as the executive team and – as we have seen time and time again – the scrutiny they provide is just not good enough. So if I’m Prime Minister, we’re going to change that system – and we’re going to have not just consumers represented on company boards, but employees as well .... I want to make shareholder votes on corporate pay not just advisory but binding. I want to see more transparency, including the full disclosure of bonus targets and the publication of “pay multiple” data: that is, the ratio between the CEO’s pay and the average company worker’s pay. And I want to simplify the way bonuses are paid so that the bosses’ incentives are better aligned with the long-term interests of the company and its shareholders.More detailed proposals will follow over the coming months. With regard to shareholder votes on pay, the UK framework currently requires a mandatory vote on policy - held at least once every three years, or when changes to policy are proposed - in addition to an annual advisory vote. It would seem that Mrs May proposes to make the annual advisory vote binding. Would this render redundant the binding vote on policy? With regard to simplifying bonuses (the call for which has been made repeatedly over the past few years), how will this be achieved?
With regard to the board proposals, much depends on what Mrs May means by "represented on company boards", but the general tenor of her comments suggests that she wants to see dramatic changes through legislation rather than relying on encouraging best practice guidance in the UK Corporate Governance Code, which is the responsibility of the Financial Reporting Council. In this respect it is interesting to note that last month the chairman of the FRC, Sir Win Bischoff, and several of his European counterparts met (describing themselves the 'five chairmen group') and published a statement in which they defended the role and value of governance codes and recommended "a cautious approach in making further legislative proposals on corporate governance issues": see here (pdf).
Friday, 8 July 2016
UK: FCA post-implementation review of crowdfunding rules
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Labels:
crowdfunding,
financial conduct authority,
uk
Thursday, 7 July 2016
UK: Female FTSE board report 2016 published
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Wednesday, 6 July 2016
UK: Supreme Court holds director had no civil liability for failure to obtain adequate insurance
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Opinion was also divided in the Supreme Court: by a majority of 3:2 the justices held that the director was not subject to civil liability. A summary is available here (pdf). A summary was also delivered this morning in person by Lord Carnwath: see the video recording below.
Tuesday, 5 July 2016
UK: FPC publishes financial stability report - risks begin to crystalise
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Monday, 4 July 2016
Pakistan: company law reform - third draft of the Companies Bill published
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Friday, 1 July 2016
UK: liquidation and the personal liability of directors - Supreme Court judgment due on July 6
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Labels:
director,
directors' duties,
insolvency,
liquidation,
scotland,
supreme court,
uk
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