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Tuesday, 31 July 2012
New Zealand: first reading for Companies and Limited Partnerships Amendment Bill
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UK: England and Wales: agency - acting for competing principals
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An agent can act for two principals with conflicting interests in two types of case. The first is, as already indicated, where both principals agree. In such a case, it is for the agent to show that the principal not merely consented, but that the consent was given on a fully informed basis – i.e. that the agent had made full disclosure to the principal – see per Tuckey LJ in Hurstanger Ltd v Wilson [2007] EWCA Civ 299, [2007] 1 WLR 2351, para 35 ... The second type of case where an agent can act for competing principals is where, as in Kelly [1993] AC 205, the principal must have appreciated that the nature of the agent's business (in that case a residential estate agent) is 'to act for numerous principals'. More generally, I agree ... that, particularly as 'estate agents are only imperfectly agents and are known to act for many principals', it is highly questionable whether the reasoning in Kelly [1993] AC 205 should be extended to other cases of agency, at least in the absence of clear evidence to support such an extension".
Europe: ESMA responds to Commission's shadow banking green paper
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Labels:
banks,
esma,
europe,
european commission,
shadow banking
Monday, 30 July 2012
UK: LIBOR and the Wheatley Review
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UK: England and Wales: restructuring, exit consent and the limits of majority power
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Whilst courts in other jurisdictions have considered the use of exit consent techniques in relation to purported duties of good faith owed by the issuer to the bondholders (see, e.g., Katz v Oak Industries Inc. (1986) 508 A.2d 873 in Delaware), what makes the current case of interest is that argument centred on the power of the majority bondholders to bind the minority. Mr Justice Briggs held that this power was not unlimited, referring to English authorities where limitations have been recognised on the power of a majority to bind a minority within a class. He accepted that it was not lawful for a majority bondholder to use its voting power to "lend its aid" to the coercion of a minority by voting for a resolution under which the minority's rights were expropriated for nominal consideration and, with regard to the the coercive use of exit consent techniques, he stated (at paras. [84] - [86]):
The exit consent is, quite simply, a coercive threat which the issuer invites the majority to levy against the minority, nothing more or less. Its only function is the intimidation of a potential minority, based upon the fear of any individual member of the class that, by rejecting the exchange and voting against the resolution, he (or it) will be left out in the cold. This form of coercion is in my judgment entirely at variance with the purposes for which majorities in a class are given power to bind minorities, and it is no answer for them to say that it is the issuer which has required or invited them to do so. True it is that, at the moment when any individual member of the class is required (by the imposition of the pre-meeting deadline) to make up his mind, there is at that point in time no defined minority against which the exit consent is aimed. But it is inevitable that there will be a defined (if any) minority by the time when the exit consent is implemented by being voted upon, and its only purpose is to prey upon the apprehension of each member of the class (aggravated by his relative inability to find out the views of his fellow class members in advance) that he will, if he decides to vote against, be part of that expropriated minority if the scheme goes ahead. Putting it as succinctly as I can, oppression of a minority is of the essence of exit consents of this kind, and it is precisely that at which the principles restraining the abusive exercise of powers to bind minorities are aimed".
Labels:
corporate bond,
england and wales,
exit consent,
uk,
voting
USA: the 10th anniversary of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
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Friday, 27 July 2012
UK: FSA Remuneration Code - FSA consults on revised proportionality guidance
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Labels:
disclosure,
fsa,
fsa handbook,
fsa remuneration code,
remuneration,
uk,
uk fsa
Europe: Commission report on the Takeover Directive
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Thursday, 26 July 2012
UK: The Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Directors’ Reports) Regulations 2013
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UK: Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards - call for evidence
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UK: England and Wales: restoration to the register and the effect of section 1032
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* - The judgment appeared on BAILII yesterday although it bears today's date.
Update (27 July 2012): a summary of the decision has been published by the ICLR - see here.
Labels:
companies act 2006,
company register,
england and wales,
uk,
winding-up
Wednesday, 25 July 2012
EU: manipulating benchmarks - Commission amendments to market abuse proposals
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Labels:
europe,
insider dealing,
insider trading,
market abuse
UK: 'Banking at the crossroads' - a speech by Lord Turner
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- Better prudential rules and new macro-prudential policy approaches.
- Structural change – the importance of the Vickers Commission recommendations.
- Better, more intense and more robust conduct supervision and enforcement, but recognising also their limitations.
- Action by the leadership of banks to improve culture and values – a difficult area but a vital one.
- And finally, some recognition by regulators, politicians, consumer groups and the general public of the complexity of the challenge and the constraints which banks face.
UK: women on boards and the voluntary code of conduct for executive search firms
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Tuesday, 24 July 2012
France: listed company AGMs - AMF final recommendations
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Labels:
amf,
board of directors,
france,
general meeting,
shareholder
Monday, 23 July 2012
UK: Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making - Final Report
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Update - ahead of the London event, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills has published a copy of the report: see here (pdf). The following recommendations are made:
- The Stewardship Code should be developed to incorporate a more expansive form of stewardship, focussing on strategic issues as well as questions of corporate governance.
- Company directors, asset managers and asset holders should adopt Good Practice Statements that promote stewardship and long-term decision making. Regulators and industry groups should takes steps to align existing standards, guidance and codes of practice with the Review's Good Practice Statements.
- An investors’ forum should be established to facilitate collective engagement by investors in UK companies.
- The scale and effectiveness of merger activity of and by UK companies should be kept under careful review by BIS and by companies themselves.
- Companies should consult their major long-term investors over major board appointments.
- Companies should seek to disengage from the process of managing short term earnings expectations and announcements.
- Regulatory authorities at EU and domestic level should apply fiduciary standards to all relationships in the investment chain which involve discretion over the investments of others, or advice on investment decisions. These obligations should be independent of the classification of the client, and should not be capable of being contractually overridden.
- Asset managers should make full disclosure of all costs, including actual or estimated transaction costs, and performance fees charged to the fund.
- The Law Commission should be asked to review the legal concept of fiduciary duty as applied to investment to address uncertainties and misunderstandings on the part of trustees and their advisers.
- All income from stock lending should be disclosed and rebated to investors.
- Mandatory IMS (quarterly reporting) obligations should be removed.
- High quality, succinct narrative reporting should be strongly encouraged.
- The Government and relevant regulators should commission an independent review of metrics and models employed in the investment chain to highlight their uses and limitations.
- Regulators should avoid the implicit or explicit prescription of a specific model in valuation or risk assessment and instead encourage the exercise of informed judgment.
- Companies should structure directors’ remuneration to relate incentives to sustainable long-term business performance. Long-term performance incentives should be provided only in the form of company shares to be held at least until after the executive has retired from the business.
- Asset management firms should similarly structure managers’ remuneration so as to align the interests of asset managers with the interests and timescales of their clients. Pay should therefore not be related to short-term performance of the investment fund or asset management firm. Rather a long-term performance incentive should be provided in the form of an interest in the fund (either directly or via the firm) to be held at least until the manager is no longer responsible for that fund.
- The Government should explore the most cost effective means for individual investors to hold shares directly on an electronic register.
Friday, 20 July 2012
UK: England and Wales: the unfair prejudice remedy - adaptable, flexible and open-textured
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The first reason concerns the concept of unfairness and breaches of directors' duties. In O'Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092 Lord Hoffmann stated that a shareholder would not ordinarily be entitled to complain of unfairness unless there had been some breach of the terms on which it was agreed that company's affairs should be conducted. According to Arden LJ these terms "... include by implication an agreement that any party who is a director will perform his duties as a director. Primary among these duties are the seven duties now codified in sections 171 to 177 of the Companies Act 2006. ... Six out of seven of these duties are fiduciary duties, that is, duties imposed by law on persons who exercise powers for the benefit of others. Non-compliance with ... [these] duties will generally indicate that unfair prejudice has occurred" (para. [22]).
The second concerns the consequences of the company's insolvency. In such cases, Arden LJ observed, the court should be flexible in its approach and to do what is necessary to achieve a just and fair result. The third concerns claims of excessive remuneration: these should be considered by the court with reference to objective commercial criteria and in this regard Arden LJ stated that "... in the light of the public debate that has taken place in recent years over executive pay in large companies, much guidance can be found about the remuneration of directors in listed companies in the various guidelines that have been produced, such as the Association of British Insurer's Principles of Remuneration" (para. [36]).
Fourth, Arden LJ provided this assessment of the role performed by section 994 (at para. [28]): "The dominant characteristic of the unfair prejudice remedy, both in statute and case law, is its adaptability. This enables the courts to produce a just remedy where minority shareholders can show wrongdoing that prejudices their interests. It also makes the unfair prejudice remedy important as a means of encouraging proper corporate behaviour in the management of smaller companies and building up the confidence of investors in them. This policy aim is as important today as it has always been since the original version of what is now the unfair prejudice remedy was introduced in the Companies Act 1947."
Thursday, 19 July 2012
UK: The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill
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Wednesday, 18 July 2012
UK: Parliamentary Committee on Banking Standards
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Labels:
banks,
financial regulation,
financial services,
uk
Tuesday, 17 July 2012
UK: trustees, delegation and ostensible authority
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An agent cannot be said to have authority solely on the basis that he has held himself out as having it. It is, however, perfectly possible for the proper authorities of a company (or, for that matter, any other principal) to organise its affairs in such a way that subordinates who would not have authority to approve a transaction are nevertheless held out by those authorities as the persons who are to communicate to outsiders the fact that it has been approved by those who are authorised to approve it or that some particular agent has been duly authorised to approve it. These are representations which, if made by some one held out by the company to make representations of that kind, may give rise to an estoppel".
Monday, 16 July 2012
USA: IFRS adoption - SEC final staff report published (but no final recommendation)
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Labels:
accounting,
disclosure,
financial reporting,
frc,
ifrs,
usa
Friday, 13 July 2012
UK: FRC discussion paper 'Towards a Disclosure Framework for the Notes'
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Thursday, 12 July 2012
Hong Kong: Legislative Council passes Companies Bill
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Spain: corporate governance of IBEX 35 companies
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UK: House of Lords EU Committee report - MIFID II
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Labels:
europe,
financial regulation,
financial services,
mifid,
uk
Wednesday, 11 July 2012
UK: England and Wales: liquidator disqualified for 12 years
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I cannot envisage circumstances in which the Court would exercise its discretion to make a disqualification order against a liquidator without serious misconduct having been established. That is not to say that each breach of duty alleged must, individually, be serious if it is to be relevant. Were a serious breach of duty established, the Court could surely take other, less important breaches into account when deciding what, if any, order to make under section 4. A number of relatively minor breaches of duty could also, taken together, be thought serious enough to warrant a disqualification order ....
I do not think it can be the case that a liquidator can apply under section 4 of the CDDA only if he has a financial interest in a disqualification order being made. In the first place, it is difficult to think of a situation in which a liquidator would ever have such an interest. To require such an interest would thus mean that liquidators could not in practice make applications under section 4. That, however, would seem to run counter to section 16(2), which expressly provides for applications by liquidators. A second point is that it is hard to see why a financial interest should necessarily be a prerequisite of an application under section 4 of the CDDA. The purpose of disqualification is essentially, after all, the protection of the public, not private advantage. Why then need an applicant always have a personal financial interest? In fact, even the Secretary of State and the Official Receiver would presumably be unable to apply under section 4 if a personal financial interest were invariably required".
Update (11 July 2012): a summary of the decision has been published here by the ICLR.
Tuesday, 10 July 2012
Germany: revised corporate governance code - copy in English published
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Monday, 9 July 2012
UK: Government consultation - the future of building societies
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Europe: the future of European company law - a view from the European Parliament
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UK: convictions for corporate manslaughter
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Friday, 6 July 2012
UK: Takeover Code amendments - three consultation papers published
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Labels:
mergers,
takeover,
takeover code,
takeover panel,
uk
Ireland: the Criminal Justice (Corruption) Bill 2012 - general scheme published
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Labels:
bribery,
corruption,
criminal law,
director,
employee,
ireland
Thursday, 5 July 2012
Europe: shadow banking consultation responses published
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UK: directors' remuneration - amendments to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill
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UK: the Nuttall Review of Employee Ownership
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Wednesday, 4 July 2012
UK: Government consultation 'Sanctions for the directors of failed banks'
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Europe: ESMA's proxy advisor consultation - responses published
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UK: Scotland: trust law - Law Commission consultation
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Tuesday, 3 July 2012
UK: the scope of the Parliamentary banking inquiry - some comments from Lord Turner
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Labels:
financial regulation,
fsa,
kay review,
uk,
uk fsa
BCBS supervisory guidance: the audit function in banks
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Labels:
audit,
banks,
basel committee,
bis,
financial services,
internal audit,
internal control
Europe: empty voting - no need for regulatory action according to ESMA
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Labels:
empty voting,
esma,
europe,
financial regulation
Monday, 2 July 2012
UK: Parliamentary committee inquiry into banking standards
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UK: the Companies (Cross-Border Mergers) Regulations 2007
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UK: Treasury Committee inquiry - corporate governance and remuneration in banks
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Europe: banking supervision in the eurozone
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Labels:
banks,
europe,
european central bank,
financial services
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