The
Delaware Supreme Court has given its opinion in
CA Inc. v AFSCME Employees Pension Plan (No. 329, 2008). The opinion has been keenly anticipated because of the issues it raises about the management of companies and the role of the directors and shareholders. AFSCME, a stockholder in CA Inc. ("the company"), submitted a bylaw for inclusion in the company's proxy materials for its 2008 annual stockholder meeting. The bylaw, if accepted, would require the board of directors to reimburse a stockholder (or group of stockholders) the reasonable expenses incurred in nominating one or more candidates in a contested election of the board of directors.
The company's board decided to exclude the proposed bylaw from the proxy materials. The SEC was informed and a request was made for a "no action" letter (one indicating that enforcement action would not be taken against the company for its exclusion of the proposed bylaw). The company argued that the proposed bylaw was not a proper subject for a stockholder action and if implemented would breach
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The AFSCME obtained legal advice taking the opposition position. The SEC decided to ask the Delaware Supreme Court for its opinion - the first time it has done so under new clarification rules in the Delaware Constitution (
Article IV, §11(8), about which see
here) - and posed two questions.
The first question was whether the AFSCME proposal was a proper subject for action by shareholders under Delaware law. The court held that it was and observed:
The shareholders of a Delaware corporation have the right “to participate in selecting the contestants” for election to the board. The shareholders are entitled to facilitate the exercise of that right by proposing a bylaw that would encourage candidates other than board-sponsored nominees to stand for election. The Bylaw would accomplish that by committing the corporation to reimburse the election expenses of shareholders whose candidates are successfully elected. That the implementation of that proposal would require the expenditure of corporate funds will not, in and of itself, make such a bylaw an improper subject matter for shareholder action".
The second question for the court was whether the AFSCME Proposal, if adopted, would cause the company to violate any Delaware law to which it was subject. The court held that it would. In reaching this decision, the court considered the proposed bylaw in the abstract and stated that it had to consider:
... any possible circumstance under which a board of directors might be required to act. Under at least one such hypothetical, the board of directors would breach their fiduciary duties if they complied with the Bylaw. Accordingly, we conclude that the Bylaw, as drafted, would violate the prohibition, which our decisions have derived from
Section 141(a), against contractual arrangements that commit the board of directors to a course of action that would preclude them from fully discharging their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders".
Unsurprisingly commentators have been quick to describe the decision as a further example of the director-centric nature of Delaware law but the court's opinion is rather more nuanced than this description suggests. For further discussion see:
HM Treasury has published a consultation paper titled "Modernising the insolvency protections for the operation of financial markets – proposals to reform Part 7 of the 1989 Companies Act". In the executive summary it is stated:
